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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the law of insider trading in both the American
and Egyptian legal systems. It seeks to pinpoint the policy rationale behind
prohibiting insider trading, the theories of civil enforcement and
criminalization, and the concept of tipping in the United States. It also analyzes
the express statutory prohibition under Egyptian law. Furthermore, it explains
the doctrinal link between securities fraud and insider trading in the U.S. as
well as the enforcement mechanisms in place at the SEC, the NYSE, and the
NASDAQ. It also surveys the surveillance authority of the Egyptian Financial
Regularity Authority and of the Egyptian Stock Exchange. It concludes to that
both the American and Egyptian law prohibit the offense of insider trading and
that there is an effective enforcement mechanism in the United States. Yet, the
Egyptian enforcement authorities still need to adopt a clear and more efficient
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procedure for enforcing the offense of insider trading. The Egyptian Financial
Regularity Authority resources should be bolstered to recruit skilled personnel
and equip them with artificial intelligence technology.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
I am very pleased to work under the supervision of Professor Donna M.
Nagy. Her distinguished scholarship in Insider Trading Law and Securities
Regulations, enriched my humble work. Professor Nagy guidance helped me
combines the theoretical and practical understanding of insider trading in
American and Egyptian Securities Regulations.
I also extend my gratitude for Fulbright Association, I send my thanks
and appreciation for the founder of the Association Mr. J. William Fulbright
and every person supports the association. I am deeply indebted to Ranya
Rashed and Asser Hany from the Fulbright commission in Egypt and Emma
Stone and Stacy Woodward from Fulbright team in the U.S, I thank them for
being supportive and understandable.
I also express my deep gratitude to the Office of International Students
at the Indiana University Maurer School of Law. I thank Professor Gabrielle
Goodwin, dean Lesley Davis, William Schaad, and Rhea May for being
professional in exercising your priceless mentoring and your support for
international students.
I am also greatly indebted to Professors Sarah Hughes, Hannah
Buxbaum, Brian Broughman, and dean Austen Parrish for their
encouragement and support during the last two years.
I thank IU Maurer Jerome Hall Law Library staff for the faciliatory of
the resources and material that helped me to complete my paper and I thank
Ashley Ahlbrand, Cindy Dabney, and Kimberly Mattioli for their invaluable
research skills workshops.
I am also greatly indebted to Alexander Mann, Emily Tanji, Brittany
Shelmon, Rhea May, Abdullah Omran and Ali Mohamed for editing my paper
and their useful notes. I am also thankful for my classmates Nutnaree
Watthanorom and Sara Hartmann for their valuable assistance along my
degree at IU Maurer Law School.
Lastly, I want to thank my parents for their unconditional love, my
siblings, uncles, and my friends to whom I will be always indebted.

2020

INSIDER TRADING FRAMEWORK
I.

57

INTRODUCTION

The Egyptian Stock Market is one of the earliest stock markets in
history. The first stock exchange established in Egypt was the Alexandria
Stock Exchange in 1888. It was one of the five most active stock markets in
the world. Unfortunately, due to the adoption of communist ideas after the
1953 revolution, market activities in Egypt radically diminished until 1992,
when the Egyptian Government switched and started applying pure capitalist
principles.1 Since then, the Egyptian Stock Market began to grow. Egyptian
Business Law Regulations adopted open market principles and strove to attract
foreign investment. They incorporated global trade customs and gave as many
incentives as they could, such as tax exemptions, simplifying foreign
corporations’ registration, and free capital rehabilitation.
However, the Egyptian Stock Market has not completely recovered
from Egypt’s communistic rule. The practices of investment in corporate stock
have never been as strong as they are in the United States. Americans tend to
invest heavily in the stock market, making it the backbone of the American
commercial system.2 More than half of the American population owns stocks
and actively trades in the stock market.3 On the other hand, a middle-class
Egyptian citizen rarely invests in the stock market on publicly held
corporations.4 It seems this is mainly because of the limited number of listed
companies in the Egyptian Stock Exchange, and not because of the lack of
profitability of the investment.5

* Masters of Law Thesis, 2018 at Maurer Law School, University of
Indiana
1

Shahira F. Abdel Shahid, Does Ownership Structure Affect Firm Value?
Evidence from the Egyptian Stock Market, SOC. SCI. RES. NETWORK (Jan. 2003),
(unpublished manuscript),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=378580.
2
See Illegal insider trading: how widespread is the problem and is there
adequate criminal enforcement?, Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong., 31-445 (2006).
3
Justin McCarthy, Just Over Half of Americans Own Stocks, Matching
Record Low, GALLUP (Apr. 20, 2016), https://news.gallup.com/poll/190883/halfamericans-own-stocks-matching-record-low.aspx.
4
Cf. Brooke Cobb, Investment Options In Egypt, INT’L STRATEGIES,
https://www.escapeartist.com/egypt/invest/investment-options-egypt/ (last visited
Mar. 25, 2020). Egyptians usually invest in unreal economies, like the real estate
market, and the resulting lack of stock investment practices between Egyptians have
had a tremendous drawback not just economically but also environmentally because
people usually direct their investment to real estate market and buy fertilized land
and engage in soil dredging to construct houses and sell the units for profit or just
keep it and gamble for expected future high prices. Id.
5
Justin Kuepper, A Guide to Investing in Egypt, BALANCE,
https://www.thebalance.com/a-guide-to-investing-in-egypt-1979021 (last updated
Jan. 26, 2020).

58

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW VOL. XIII:II

The price–earnings ratio in the Egyptian stock market is higher than
the American ratio.6 Partnership corporations and family-owned businesses
are the most dominant forms of investment in the Egyptian commercial
system. A culture of investing in the stock market is crucial for a healthy
financial system. In order to recover the Egyptian financial system, the capital
market regulatory authority must seek means to increase the number of
companies listed in stock exchanges and develop a mechanism to raise public
interest in investing in publicly traded companies.
In addition, market integrity is crucial for the robustness of active
stock markets in any given country. The investor needs a fair market and
trustworthy insiders. Market integrity is built on two main components:
adequate disclosure and a fraud-free market. Stock market actors, such as
directors, officers, key employees (insiders), broker-dealers, investment
banks, and outside counsel (temporary insiders), play a crucial role in building
market integrity. They have access to material, nonpublic information about
the company. If these actors trade or tip someone else to trade based on this
information, they can gain profits or avoid losses in a way that is not available
to ordinary shareholders. Misusing this nonpublic information negates market
integrity, and, for that reason, countries prohibit the offense of insider trading.
As in American securities regulations, Egyptian securities regulations
that prohibit securities fraud are very broad. Egyptian law directly prohibits
insider trading, but not on the basis of common law fraud as in American law.
Egyptian securities regulations adopted different tools to curtail insider
trading. Some of these rules expressly prohibit trading on the basis of material,
nonpublic information, and others prohibit any fraudulent or manipulative acts
that could influence securities prices. Criminalization of insider trading under
Egyptian law finds its basis in the Capital Market Law (CML) No. 95 of 1992,
which stipulates the penalty of imprisonment for a term not less than two years
and a fine of up to 20 million EGP or twice the amount of gains realized, or
the loss avoided.7 There are also different authorities who are empowered to
enforce securities regulations. The Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA) is
the main surveillance authority over the stock market. The CML empowers the
chairman of the FRA with the right to prosecute any violation of its regulations
and the right to settle in any stage of a lawsuit. Article 21 of the CML gives
the stock exchange chairman the power to revoke transactions that in violation
6
Egypt P/E Ratio, CEIC, https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/egypt/peratio (last visited Dec. 24, 2018, 11:31 AM) (listing the price/earnings ratio in
Egypt); United States Steel PE Ratio, https://ycharts.com/companies/X/pe_ratio (last
visited Dec. 24, 2018, 11:33 AM) (listing price/earnings ratio in the United States).
The total number of listed companies in Egyptian Exchange including Nilex are
around 300. Egyptian Exchange (EGX) - Listed Companies, AFR. MKTS.,
https://www.african-markets.com/en/stock-markets/egx/listed-companies (last
visited Dec. 24, 2018, 11:29 AM).
7
Capital Market Law No. 95 of 1992 (Mar. 14, 2018)
https://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Egypt/Egypt_Capital_Market_Law_1992.pdf.
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of the CML or other related securities provisions.8 The Egyptian legal system
also allows shareholders to bring private actions through a direct complaint to
the Attorney General’s office, which has the authority to prosecute insider
trading after the permission of the FRA chairman.
This research intends to examine whether the Egyptian regulations
that prohibit insider trading are sufficient and if there is an adequate
enforcement mechanism in place. It will address the Egyptian regulations’
shortcomings and steps to develop a robust framework where necessary. The
study will compare and contrast U.S. and Egyptian securities regulations to
examine if there are deficiencies in Egyptian securities regulations or its
enforcement mechanism to prevent and prohibit insider trading. In the
introduction, we define insider trading and the policy rationale behind the
prohibition. Chapter I will be assigned to give a description of insider trading
under American law in order to provide a reasonable background for the new
reader. Chapter II discusses the enforcement mechanism in both the Egyptian
and American legal systems.
A. Definition of Insider Trading
The term “insider trading” is a misnomer because insider trading
applies to trade by persons who are not necessarily insiders of the corporation
issuer. Insider trading can also be committed by “outsiders” who do not
temporarily or permanently work or provide any services to the issuer.9 Also,
the information that may form the basis for sale or purchase could be outside
information, as in the case of tender offers.10 Further, insider trading may
occur, theoretically, by canceling a contemplated trade based on inside
information.11 However, Rule 10b–5’s “in connection with” element would
8

Id. The chairman of stock exchange may suspend trading offers and bids
aiming price manipulation. He may revoke transactions which violate laws,
provisions, regulations and decrees related to their implementation, or which have
been carried out with manipulated prices. He may also suspend the trading of a given
security in case its continuing transaction causes harm to the market or to
participants in the market. The Chairman of the Authority may take any of the
preceding actions at due time. Id.
9
United Sates v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). Outsider trading refers to
securities transactions based on material nonpublic information by individual who
are not insider nor temporary insider of the issuer, the liability in these circumstances
was not available before indorsing misappropriation theory of insider trading. Id.
10
Report of the Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading - Part I:
Regulation under the Antifraud Provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
41 BUS. LAW. 223,224 (1985).
11
Definition of Insider Trading: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Sec. of
the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong. 75-705 (1987). I
agree with Senator Armstrong when he questioned Mr. Cox saying:
“Can you violate insider trading law by not
trading? In other words, suppose you are
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not extend to decisions to forego a planned security purchase or sale. Federal
Securities Laws do not define insider trading, and the term “insider trading”
does not expressly exist in any legislation.12 There was always reluctance when
it came to codify a statutory definition for insider trading. Some scholars
believe this reluctance was due to political reasons.13
Arnold Jacobs testified in his statement to the U.S. House Report,
Energy and Commerce Committee saying that, in order to enforce the broad
anti-fraud provisions, a statutory definition was not desirable and, if we did
create a definition, “unscrupulous traders would skirt around any definition
constructed.”14 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) defended its

intending to trade and then come into possession
of such information and then don’t trade. Does
that violate the law? He said no! But I don’t agree
because avoiding the loss if he will buy over
valued stocks or gain profits by maintain stocks
he was going to sell for undervalued price that’s
advantage not available for other shareholders
Id. at 126. However, because the Rule 10b-5 stipulated that the actionable
insider trading act need to occur “in connection with” securities transaction not just
by canceling a contemplated transaction, as professor Manne believe “[a] failure to
sell cannot be violated of SEC Rule 10b-5, because there has been no securities
transaction.”). Henry C. Manne, Insider Trading and Property Rights in New
Information, 4 CATO J. 933, 938 (1985).
12
JAMES D. COX,ROBERT W. HILLMAN & DONALD C. LANGEVOORT,
SECURITIES REGULATIONS: SELECTED STATUTES, RULES, AND FORMS 486 (2017).
The preliminary note to §240.10b5-2 says “This section provides a non-exclusive
definition of circumstances in which a person has a duty of trust or confidence for
purposes of the ‘misappropriation’ theory of insider trading under Section 10(b) of
the Act and Rule 10b-5. The law of insider trading is otherwise defined by judicial
opinions.” Id.
13
See Jonathan R. Macey, From Judicial Solutions to Political Solutions:
The New, New Direction of the Rules Against Insider Trading, 39 ALA. L. REV. 355
(1988). Macey argues that there is one core side of the offense of insider trading is
the political component, this side did not receive adequate treatment from securities
scholars in compare with other cores like ethical and economic perspective. This lack
of scholarly writing addressing the political perspectives of insider trading seems to
be unbeknown in light of the current political fight among the SEC, Congress, and
federal courts about who deserves to regulate insider trading. Each party had his own
interests to be the regulator, and this could be clear if we reviewed their proposed
regulations. The fact that federal courts are the least of three battled parties could be
politically influenced make them able to articulate a reasonable treatment to insider
trading. But this created a detest for SEC and Congress because of the original
legislation authority they empowered in terms of securities regulations, and that
leads to an intentional frustrate for the principle that the United States Supreme court
had established treating insider trading over the years. Id.
14
The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984: Hearing on H.R. 559 Before
the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong. 34-541 (1983).
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“I know it when I see it, but I can’t tell you what it is”15 standard by saying,
“the commission does not believe a statutory definition is necessary for the
continued success of its enforcement program.”16 The SEC believes that
adopting a certain definition may impede its enforcement actions and prevent
it from dealing with new market trends. Furthermore, the SEC contends that
the adoption of a definition will not increase the sanctions that are allowed
under securities anti-fraud provisions. These views are backed up by the
American Law Institute and the American Bar Association, who contend that
this issue should be left up to further judicial development and that it is hard
to come up with an exclusive definition that can encompass Rule 10b–5 as it
evolves. Then, if we do not have a definition for insider trading, how may we
describe a certain action as being insider trading?
Steinberg and Wang defined insider trading as “trading by anyone
(inside or outside of the issuer) on any type of material nonpublic information
about the issuer or about the market for the security.”17 Hence, insider trading
is a generic term that applies to anyone, whether it is an individual or an entity,
who lawfully or unlawfully obtains advantageous information—driven from
inside the issuer or from the market about the issuer securities—and trades
based on this information. Whether or not this trade constitutes trading “on the
basis of material nonpublic information” will be determined under Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 Section 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5, thereunder.
However, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not address all frauds that may
committed in the business, but only those “in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.” In other words, the fraud must somehow “touch” upon
securities transactions.18
B.

Whether or not Insider Trading Prohibition is Justified.

Some securities scholars, as well as economists, argued that trading
on nonpublic information may benefit stock market efficiency. We will survey
the core views for those who believe that insider trading should be legalized
and follow that with counterarguments that refute that assumption.
1.

Insider trading should be legal:

The stock market dynamic, which may occur due to insiders’
transactions, led some economists to concentrate their views on short-term
economic benefits rather than the principles of fairness. They stand for the
legalization of insider trading, alleging that it is a reward for performance and
creates a new entrepreneurial role in the market.

15

Id.
Define Insider Trading, supra note 11.
17
William Wang & Marc Steinberg, INSIDER TRADING 1 (2010).
18
Id. at 200.
16
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Insider trading is a reward for performance:

Henry Manne believes that the attack on insider trading is, in fact, a
war against free capital markets.19 He compares the insiders’ right to trade on
their ideas and innovations with the patent system, which secures an exclusive
right for the inventor.20 He says insider trading promotes innovation.21 Each
smart employee is an entrepreneur, and his valuable ideas are his capital and
should be put into practice to profit.22 As capital increases its rate of return,
ideas should be compensated.23 He continues to say that, while corporations
have other compensation tools, they are inadequate because they are set in
advance, and fair compensation should match individual contributions.24
Salary, special bonuses, or stock options are not compensatory enough to meet
the ambition, enthusiasm, and self-confidence of employees and do not “serve
the needs of the entrepreneur for the massive reward for great innovations.”25
1.2

Insider trading will add more players to the market:

Professor Manne also argues that insider trading allows any individual
who works for a publicly traded corporation to play an entrepreneurial role,
which is an important advantage.26 Individuals can, in effect, sell their own
ideas without the necessity of having a large amount of capital available.27 This
also serves as an economic function that benefits the corporation; it will allow
imaginative employees to take risks and be less conservative.28
Professor Manne’s thesis has been criticized through the years.
Scholars responding to Manne’s thesis contend that insider trading is an
inadequate method for compensating corporate managers. Initially, there are
trading hedge rules for the stock market that limit risk. If we accept Professor
Manne’s thesis, then insiders hoping for massive personal profit will devalue
any trading rules, customs, and principles, and this could cause a disaster for
the entire market. Easterbrook further explained that permitting insider trading
practices would increase the number of people engaging in unreasonably risky
business activities.29 He continued analyzing the inadequacy of presumed
managers and the rewards system saying that there is a difference between
19

Henry G. Manne, In Defense of Insider Trading, 44(6) HARV. BUS. REV.
113 (1966).
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Id.
23
Id.
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary
Privileges, and the Production of Information, SUP. CT. REV. 309, 332 (1981).
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investors and managers in terms of risk factors related to stock prices.30
Investors are free to invest in a portfolio to reduce risk, which makes them less
sensitive to stock price volatility.31 However, because managers do not have
the option to diversify, they are more sensitive to the volatility of stock
prices.32 That leads us to the fact that “most managers would prefer the
certainty of $100,000 salary to a salary of $50,000 and a 10 percent chance of
a bonus of $500,000.”33
Furthermore, permitting insider trading may become an incentive for
managers to accept and tolerate losses and negative developments instead of
striving to overcome them because they can benefit from bad news as well as
good news.34 Finally, the positive contributions and developments that
business managers bring to their corporations are closely examined and
appreciated by the entire financial system. Big corporations will fight to hire
smart managers, officers, and key employees whose activities add value to
corporations no matter how expensive their salaries, bonuses, stock options, or
other types of compensation are.35 Hence, saying that insider trading is the best
and most adequate compensation method for corporate innovators is no longer
plausible.
1.3

Insider trading contributes to market efficiency:

Carlton and Fischel argued that stock market efficiency is another
reason to advocate for insider trading.36 They argued that insider trading plays
the same role as disseminated information in terms of informing the
shareholders and consequently influencing the price of stocks.37 They claim
that when an insider trades, the stock price will reflect this change as if the
information has been disclosed.38 The more disclosure for the identity of the
insider, the closer the stock reflects its true price.39 This means corporations

30

Id.
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Robert J. Haft, The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal
Efficiency of the Large Corporation, 80 MICH. L. REV. 5 (1982).
35
Broadcom paid its CEO Hock Tan a total compensation package of
$103.2 million. See Kathleen Elkins, Median CEO pay reaches $12.1 million –
here’s how much the 4 highest-paid leaders earn, CNBC (May 9, 2018)
https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/09/how-much-the-5-highest-paid-ceos-earn.html.
36
Daniel R. Fischel and Dennis W. Carlton, The Regulation of Insider
Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857 (1982).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
U.S. brokerage firms publish corporation's insider transactions as an
indicator to inform investors about stock's future price. See, ROBINHOOD,
https://robinhood.com/ (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
31
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can control the stock price by controlling the communication of information
through insider trading.
The application of this theory is inapplicable because it assumes that
insider trading is a disclosure tool; it assumes that the corporation utilizes
insider trading to tell the shareholder and the interested public that
developments occurred, so watch how the insiders trade and react accordingly.
Also, this assumes that insiders always put their corporation’s interests before
their personal interests, and that is rare in humans. Besides, what if an insider’s
transactions were fabricated, intended only to manipulate the price, and there
is no actual ground for price change? How would we assess the accuracy of
this disseminated information as we do with prospectuses or corporations’
periodic reports? Who will be liable in cases of violations; the insider who
traded or the corporation?
2.

Why insider Trading should be Prohibited?

Securities literature presents four main policy justifications for
prohibiting insider trading: fairness, market integrity, enhance prompt
disclosure, and property protection.
2.1

Insider trading is not fair:

Insider trading is not fair because it harms the investor, the issuer, the
bidder in cases of tender offers or mergers, and market participants, such as
broker-dealers.40 Focusing our discussion over the first person affected by
insider trading, we will look from the stockholder’s side. The fairness
approach is based on the parity of information that should exist between two
parties for any normal transaction. However, information parity does not
mean—as the SEC proposed—that transaction parties should stand on the
same level of knowledge, or “level playing field,” about the securities
transactions.41 Instead, fairness means there is no asymmetry of information
access to the securities forgo prices because of firm-specific information, not
because of general market conditions.42 This means the issue is not the
40

Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1053 (1977). The trial court in Fridrich v. Bradford, held that the insider trader had
breached a duty to the entire market, and set damages representing the “losses” of all
traders who had sold during the period from the insider's purchase until the
disclosure. Id.
41
“The law has no patience with plaintiffs who are foolish or overcautious.”
Grant v. Attrill, 11 F. 469, 470 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882) (“The [plaintiff] seems to have
preferred to sell rather than risk the management promised; and he sold out”); see
Paula J. Dalley, From Horse Trading to Insider Trading: The Historical Antecedents
of the Insider Trading Debate, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289 (1998).
42
William J. Carney, Signaling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 Cath.
U. L. Rev. 863 (1987). See also, Chief Justice Marshall’s notice in Laidlaw v. Organ,
15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 195 (1817), if there is no superiority in terms of information
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information asymmetry itself but how the information is obtained; trading
based on good faith effort to understand the forego market prices is permitted,
while trading based on stolen information is prohibited.43 Professor William J.
Carney investigated the causation of investor injury because of insider
trading.44 He concluded, “The loss of an investor is caused by the revelation
of truthful information, which he or she lacked at the time of trading, and
which causes the market to revalue the particular issuer's shares.”45 Whether
the transaction was face-to-face or in person “investors are directly solicited,
the insider has in fact induced the other person to transact with him or her, and
causation is relatively clear.”46 The trial court in Fridrich v. Bradford, applied
this understanding and held that the insider trader breached a duty to the entire
market, and set damages representing the “losses” of all traders who had sold
their stocks during the period from the insider's purchase until the disclosure.47
The Court in United States v. O’Hagan stated, “A misappropriator who trades
on the basis of material, nonpublic information, in short, gains his
advantageous market position through deception; he deceives the source of the
information and simultaneously harms members of the investing public.”48
When insiders remain silent about material information pertaining to
the transaction of their corporation’s securities, they commit deception and
cheat the shareholders, who placed their trust and confidence in them and
expected them to speak.49 Finally, saying that insider trading should be
considered a reward for performance would open the door for fraud and affect
market efficiency.
2.2

Insider trading negatively affect market confidence:

The Supreme Court in United States v. O’Hagan used very clear
language to warn against how insider trading undermines investor confidence
and impact negatively the entire economic system. The Court said, “Although
informational disparity is inevitable in the securities markets, investors likely
would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where trading based on
misappropriated nonpublic information is unchecked by law.” The Supreme
Court also emphasized that “if the market is thought to be systematically
populated with … transactors -trading on the basis of misappropriated
information- some investors will refrain from dealing altogether, and others
accessibility “[i]t would be difficult to circumscribe the contrary doctrine within
proper limits, where the means of intelligence are equally accessible to both parties.”
43
William J. Carney, Signaling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH.
U. L. REV. 863, 864 (1987).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
429 U.S. 1053 (1977).
48
U.S. v. O’Hagan, 117 U.S. 2199 (1997).
49
Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary
Principles, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1315 (2009).
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will incur costs to avoid dealing with such transactors or corruptly to overcome
their unerodable informational advantages.” 50
Furthermore, from an economic view, if insiders were allowed to
transact based on inside knowledge they would induce or prevent a securities
transaction that was not going to be executed if there was no insider trading.
In the long run, these transactions cause stock market flow to shift from its
economic normal format, and consequently widen the distance between the
economic reality of stocks and its trading prices. This fictitious shift will cause
stock prices to be either underpriced or overpriced and this will undermine
market confidence.
Laura Beny conducted an empirical study on 33 countries, including
highly developed and newly emerging stock markets.51 The study proved that
countries that had a robust prohibitive system against insider trading enjoyed
“ownership dispersion, stock price informativeness, and stock market
liquidity.”52
2.3

Prohibiting insider trading enhances prompt disclosure:53

Disclosure plays a crucial role in building an efficient stock market.
Market efficiency means that stock information—both public and private—is
fully reflected in its prices. The more efficient markets can become, the more
closely stocks’ intrinsic value is reflected in its prices. Corporations used to
make selective disclosures to certain securities market professionals. These
practices prompted the SEC to enact Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD) to
mandate public companies’ simultaneous disclosures to the public when
corporate officials first made selective disclosures to a privileged few. This
regulation applies to persons like brokers or dealers, investment advisers,
personnel of an investment company, any persons who owe a duty of trust or
confidence, or any other associated persons. Rule 100(b) of regulation FD
allows disclosure to insiders or temporary insiders and exempts them from
selective disclosure prohibitions.
Express liability of insider trading prompts, to a certain level, those
who are potentially liable to make timely public disclosure, so they avoid
potential charges. Hence, the point is that if insiders to the material nonpublic

50

O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654.
Laura N. Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the
World: An Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate,
32 J. CORP. L. 237 (2007).
52
Id.
53
See the argument that insider trading plays the same role as disseminated
information and the counterargument we presented. Supra Section 1.3.
51

2020

INSIDER TRADING FRAMEWORK

67

information cannot trade while business secrets exit, they will be motivated to
release information promptly and widely.
2.4

Prohibiting insider trading enhance private property protection:

A corporation’s important nonpublic information is an intangible asset
owned by the corporation and, by extension, to all of its shareholders. Title
transfer of valuable information or an “intangible asset” or depleting it for the
insiders’ private benefit is more or less a kind of property theft. The rationale
for assigning property rights to valuable information for the stockholder or the
corporation is the same as the rationale in prohibiting patent infringement.54
Corporations will only be incentivized to innovate and engage in
strategic decisions if they can capture the value of these investments without
the fear of theft. Courts permit shareholders private action for insiders trading
in order to protect shareholders’ property interest in a corporation’s nonpublic
information.55
II.

THE OFFENSE OF INSIDER TRADING

A. Classical and Misappropriation Theories in American Federal
Courts, Fraud in Connection with the Purchase or Sale of Security
Rule (10b-5).
Fraudulent nondisclosure was the earliest lawsuit shareholders
brought in the United States courts against corporate officers.56 Although
fraudulent conduct under common law requires an affirmative misstatement
and reliance to prove fraud,57 courts recognized that, in certain circumstances,
pure silence about material information could be sufficient to plead fraud.58
One of these circumstances is when there is a fiduciary relationship between
the two parties to a transaction. Courts, at this time, varied in evaluating these
circumstances for what is called the “majority rule” and “minority rule.”
Under the majority rule, insiders owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation only,
not to the shareholders. This means insiders are free to use “material nonpublic
54

Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Regulation: The Path Dependent
Choice between Property Rights and Securities Fraud, 52 S.M.U. L. Rev.
1589,1606–08 (1999).
55
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, 495 F.2d 228 (2nd Cir. 1974), the court
accepted the implied cause of action of insider trading and limited the right of action
to shareholders who had traded contemporaneously with the insider.
56
. Donna M. Nagy, Richard W. Painter, and Margaret V. Sachs, Securities
Litigation and Enforcement: Cases and Materials, 4th Edition (2017).
57
Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178, 195 (1817), Chief Justice
Marshall stated parties to transactions have no affirmative duty of disclosure.
58
Nagy, Painter, Sachs, supra note 56, at 490.
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information” in transactions with the corporation’s shareholders without any
disclosure obligations.59 Meanwhile, under the “minority rule,” insiders are
fiduciaries for both the corporation and the shareholders and thus, insiders
cannot remain silent about material nonpublic information.60 Yet, under the
minority rule, there are still certain prerequisites for fiduciary obligation, like
face-to-face transactions and transacting with a party who had a pre-existing
relationship with the corporation. In Goodwin v. Agassiz,61 the court said an
insider trading violation would not exist if the identity of the insider was
unknown to the buyer (the shareholder) and there was no face-to-face
transaction.
Before enacting the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act), courts used to adjudicate
securities fraud disputes under Common Law and the Criminal Code.
The United States Supreme Court shaped and endorsed Classical and
Misappropriation theories of insider trading in three cases: Chiarella v. United
States62 in 1980, Dirks v. SEC63 in 1983, and United States v. O’Hagan64 in
1997. We will closely examine these three cases through the coming chapter.
1.

The Classical Theory of Insider Trading

Traditional, special relationship or classical theory were the terms that
courts used to refer to the offense of insider trading when there was a
relationship between the corporate insider and the buyer or seller of securities
of that corporation.65 In Dirks v. SEC, the Supreme Court referred to a “special
relationship” between the insider of the corporation and its shareholders.66

59
Bawden v. Taylor, 254 Ill. 464 (1912). The plaintiff prayed to set aside
the stock sale under the Criminal Code, prohibiting gambling in stocks, the court
said, “officer of corporation is not a trustee for stockholders as respects their stock.”
Officers are trustees for the stockholders as a body not for an individual stockholder.
Id.
60
Dawson v. Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 157 N.W. 929, 938 (Iowa 1916).
61
. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (Mass. 1933).
43
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). Chiarella consider the
source of the “classical” or “traditional” theory of insider trading liability.
63
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
64
United Sates v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). Prior to O'Hagan, a
majority of the Court had recognized Section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5 liability for
insider trading only under the classical theory. See Donna M. Nagy, “Reframing the
Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A Post-O'Hagan Suggestion”,
MAURER SCH. OF L. 1223 (1998).
65
William K.S. Wang & Marc I. Steinberg, Insider Trading, 52 THE BUS.
LAW. 1431 (1997).
66
Wang & Steinberg, supra, note 17, at 291.
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This special fiduciary relationship was the basis of the classical theory for
insider trading.67
The Supreme Court in Chiarella v. United States defined the elements
of insider trading under classical theory, which defines who the insider is, to
whom the insider owes the fiduciary duty, and what the limits of their liabilities
are.68
The facts of Chiarella v. United States came as the petitioner, Vincent
Chiarella, was employed by a financial printer that engaged to print corporate
takeover materials.69 Chiarella deduced the names of the target corporation
before receiving the true names on the final printing night.70 He purchased
stock in the target companies and after the takeover went public, he profited
from selling the purchased shares.71 After an SEC investigation, Chiarella
entered into an agreement with the SEC to return the profits he made to the
sellers of the shares.72 Thereafter, he was indicted and convicted for violating
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5—as the jury was instructed—because he
willfully failed to disclose to the sellers of the target company the inside
information about the forthcoming takeover bid.73
1.1

The Supreme Court ruling on Chiarella:

The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit conviction and ruled
that Chiarella’s conviction under Section 10(b) was improper because the
liability under Section 10(b) is premised upon a duty to disclose arising from
a relationship of trust between parties to a transaction.74 Because Chiarella was
not an insider and did not owe the acquired corporation shareholders a duty to
disclose, he also was not a fiduciary for the sellers of the target corporation
because they had not placed their trust in him.75 The Supreme Court said
Chiarella’s conviction could not be justified on the alternative theory under
Rule 10b-5 that he breached a fiduciary duty to the acquiring corporation to
whom Chiarella owed a duty of trust because such a theory was not presented
to the jury.76

67

Zachary J. Gubler, A Unified Theory of Insider Trading Law, Harv. L.
Sch. F. on Corp. Governance (Sept. 30, 2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/09/30/a-unified-theory-of-insider-trading-law/.
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Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222.
69
Id. at 224.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. at 225.
74
Id. at 236–37.
75
Id. at 232–33.
76
Id. at 236–37.
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The Supreme Court said there is no such evidence from the language
or the legislative history of Section 10(b) that can form such a broad disclosure
duty between all participants in market transactions based on the mere
possession of material, nonpublic information.77 Instead, there is a detailed
securities regulation that recognizes when such use of nonpublic information
may not harm the efficiency of the stock market.78 Hence, classical theory
liability requires a duty to disclose, and that this duty arises from a relationship
of trust and confidence between parties to a transaction. Since the sellers of the
target corporation stocks did not put their trust in Chiarella, the Supreme Court
reversed the indictment saying there was no “general duty between all
participants in market transaction to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic
information.”79 However, insiders such as officers and directors of the
corporation whose stock is traded do owe such duties to the corporation’s
shareholders.80 The Court left open the possibility of Chiarella’s indictment
under other theories because they were not included in the jury instructions.
Justice Burger dissented saying the language of Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 which says “[A]ny person [engaged in] . . . any [fraudulent]
scheme”81 would encompass any person who misappropriated nonpublic
information, and that person has an absolute duty to disclose or abstain from
trading. It is not only limited to corporate insiders.82
1.2

Dirks v. SEC83

In Dirks v. SEC, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Court of
Appeals insider trading judgement against Dirks, who was an officer of a New
York broker-dealer firm specialized in analysis of insurance companies’
securities.84 Ronald Secrist, a former officer of an insurance company
incentivized by verifying and exposing fraud, gave Dirks inside information
about how overstated his insurance company’s assets were.85 Based on
Secrist’s information, Dirks started his own investigation and during this stage
of investigation, he openly discussed that information with a number of his
clients.86 Neither Dirks nor his firm owned or traded that insurance company’s
stocks, but some of his clients sold their stocks based on his tips before the

77

Id.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. II 1976). Williams Act allows for a certain
limit the bidder in tender offer to trade on the target corporation before announcing
the tender offer.
79
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 661.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236–37.
83
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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Id.
85
Id. at 649.
86
Id.
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stock price fell.87 The SEC charged Dirks with securities fraud under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5, alleging that he aided and abetted his clients to sell their
stocks in the insurance company based on material, nonpublic information
conveyed by company insiders. 88
The Supreme Court reaffirmed Chiarella v. United States,
acknowledged its violation elements,89 and added that Rule 10b-5 also requires
a scheme of “manipulation or deception” to make personal profits.90
1.3

Elements of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s Violation Under
Classical Theory

Chiarella set the precedent that a violation of Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5 by corporate insiders requires a breach of a disclosure duty that arises
from a relationship of trust and confidence between the transaction parties.91
This requires, first, that the existence of such a relationship affords access to
inside information intended to be available only for the corporation’s purposes,
and second, that it will be unfair to allow a corporate insider—or a coparticipant—to take advantage of that information by trading without
informing the victim.
1.4

Can Silence Constitute a Manipulative or Deceptive Device?

Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 require the use of a “deceptive device”
in connection with a securities transaction to be charged with insider trading.
At this point, can pure silence be sufficient to plead securities fraud under
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, thereunder?
Neither the language of Section 10(b) nor Rule 10b-5 answers this
question. The Second Circuit found in Frigitemp Corp. v. Fin. Dynamics Fund,
Inc. that “the party charged with failing to disclose market information must
be under a duty to disclose.”92 Thus, silence in connection with securities
transactions may be considered fraud under Section 10(b) when there is a duty
to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between

87

Id.
Id. at 650–51.
89
Id. at 646–47. There are “[t]wo elements for establishing a violation of §
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by corporate insiders [which] are the existence of a
relationship affords access to inside information intended to be available only for
corporate purpose, and the unfairness of allowing a corporate insider to take
advantage of that information by trading without disclosure.” Id.
90
Id. at 647.
91
Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222.
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Frigitemp Corp v. Financial Dynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275, 282 (2d
Cir. 1975).
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transaction parties.93 In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, the Court held
that the bank agent had a duty to inform its mixed-blood Indian customers that
their shares could be sold for a higher price on a non-Indian market. 94 The
bank agent’s duty to inform arose from the trust that the Indian customers
placed in him.95 Hence, silence may constitute a manipulative or deceptive
device when there is a relationship of reliance and trust.
1.5

Who is an Insider Under Classical Theory?

The Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC indicated that liability under the
classical theory applies to not only officers, directors, and other permanent
insiders of the corporation, but also to "temporary insiders" or "quasi-insiders,"
such as attorneys, accountants, and investment bankers who become
temporary fiduciaries of the corporation.96 In Dirks, the Supreme Court
developed the idea of temporary insiders, stating that
[u]nder certain circumstances, such as where corporate
information is revealed legitimately to an underwriter,
accountant, lawyer, or consultant working for the corporation,
these outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders.
The basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that
such persons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but
rather that they have entered into a special confidential
relationship in the conduct of the business of the enterprise and
are given access to information solely for corporate purposes.97

Further, the issuer may be included in the circle of classical theory
and treated as an insider. Courts have treated corporations trading on the basis
of inside information to benefit the corporation itself as any person subject to
the disclose or abstain rule.98
1.6

Possession vs. Use

Under the classical theory, liability requires insider trading to take
place while “in possession of” material, nonpublic information. However,
93
94

Nagy, Painter, Sachs, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 517.
Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 152–53

(1972).
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463 U.S. at 655.
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Id. at n.14.
98
The term “insider” is also used to describe persons such as attorneys, and
other professionals who work as temporary agents of the corporation (sometimes
termed “temporary insiders” or “quasi-insiders”). See Wang & Steinberg, supra note
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 303; see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222.
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questions remain whether one must possess material, nonpublic information in
all occasions and whether one must disclose or abstain from trading, if one is
only barred from using this information in trading. Whether liability for insider
trading under Rule 10b-5 should be determined pursuant to a “knowing
possession” test or a “use” test is still debated.99
In SEC v. Adler100 and United States v. Smith,101 the two federal courts
rejected the SEC possession standard and ruled that Rule 10b-5 only prohibits
trading on the basis of material, nonpublic information.102 Therefore, if a
person trades while in the possession of material, nonpublic information, the
government still needs to prove that the person actually used the inside
information in a trading decision.
However, in United States v. Teicher,103 the Second Circuit reached
the opposite ruling and stipulated “a knowing possession” for three reasons:
first, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 only require that a deceptive practice be
conducted “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security”—the “in
connection with” clause must be “construed flexibly to include deceptive
practices ‘touching’ the sale of securities.”104 Second, a “knowing possession”
standard comports with the maxim that one with a fiduciary or similar duty to
hold material, nonpublic information in confidence must either “disclose or
abstain.”105 Finally, a “knowing possession” standard has the attribute of
simplicity, recognizing that one who trades while knowingly possessing
material, inside information has an informational advantage over other
traders.106
The SEC did not wait for this conflict to be solved through case-bycase adjudication. The SEC opted to use its authority under Section 10(b) to
promulgate Rule 10b-5-1 to endorse a “knowing possession”107 with an
affirmative defense in Rule 10b-5-1(c)(1)(i), which provides that a purchase
99

Nagy, Painter, Sachs, supra note 56, at 546.
137 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1998).
101
155 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 1998).
102
The court summarized the SEC’s position stating that
[t]he Commission also believes that Rule 10b–5 does not
require a showing that an insider sold his securities for the purpose
of taking advantage of material nonpublic information . . . . If an
insider sells his securities while in possession of material adverse
non-public information, such an insider is taking advantage of his
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SEC Release No. 14675 (April 14, 1978).
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or sale is not “on the basis of” material, nonpublic information if there was a
predetermined plan for the sale or purchase of securities. This includes
entering into a good faith, binding contract for the sale or purchase of
securities, instructing another person to transact on the account owner’s behalf,
or adopting a written plan for trading securities.108
2.

The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading

The misappropriation theory was introduced to protect the integrity of
security markets from outsiders who have access to a corporation’s secrets but
owe no fiduciary duty to the corporation’s shareholders.
According to the misappropriation theory, one commits insider trading
securities fraud under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5 when one, “in connection with” a securities transaction, misappropriates
confidential information in a breach of duty of loyalty and confidentiality
owed to the source109of information who owns the exclusive use of that
information.
2.1

United States v. O’Hagan110

In United States v. O’Hagan, the United States Supreme Court was
confronted with similar facts as in Chiarella v. United States, but in O’Hagan,
the court was not restricted by limited jury instructions.
James O’Hagan was a partner in the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney
that was hired to represent Grand Metropolitan PLC on a potential tender
offer.111 While Dorsey & Whitney law firm was still retained to represent
Grand Metropolitan, O’Hagan started purchasing call options for the target
company stocks.112 When the tender offer was publicly announced, O’Hagan
sold his stock for a profit of $4.3 million.113 The SEC charged O’Hagan, inter
alia, for misappropriating material, nonpublic information for personal benefit
and defrauding Grand Metropolitan PLC and the Dorsey & Whitney law firm
who was working for the bidder.114 The indictment charged O’Hagan with the
violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 for fraudulent trading in connection
108

See Rule 10b-5-1(c)(1)(i).
Professor Nagy suggests a broader “fraud on investors” version of the
misappropriation theory, she says investors in the marketplace are also deceived and
defrauded when a person purchases or sells securities based on material, nonpublic
information that has been misappropriated from the information's source. See Nagy,
Donna M., "Reframing the Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Liability: A
Post-O'Hagan Suggestion" (1998). Articles by Maurer Faculty. Paper 615., at 1223.
110
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642.
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with a tender offer in violation of Section 14(e) of the Exchange Act and SEC
Rule 14e-3(a).115 O’Hagan was convicted and sentenced to prison.116
The Eighth Circuit reversed O’Hagan’s conviction, holding that
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 liability may not be grounded on the
misappropriation theory.117 Further, the Eighth Circuit said misappropriation
theory is inconsistent with Section 10(b), and under Chiarella and Dirks
ruling, “Only a breach of a duty to parties to a securities transaction, or, at the
most, to other market participants such as investors, will be sufficient to give
rise to § 10(b) liability.”118
The United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Eighth
Circuit decision and ruled that a person who trades in securities for personal
profit, using confidential information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary
duty to the source of the information, will be found guilty of violating Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.119 The United States Supreme Court said the Eighth
Circuit erred in holding that the misappropriation theory is inconsistent with
Section 10(b) because the deceptive nondisclosure is essential to Section 10(b)
liability under the theory. Hence, it was O’Hagan’s failure to disclose his
personal trading to Grand Met and Dorsey while he is required to speak that
made his conduct “deceptive” under Section 10(b).
The Supreme Court further explained that
[i]n lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship
between company insider and purchaser or seller of the
company’s stock, the misappropriation theory premises
liability on a fiduciary-turned-trader’s deception of those who
entrusted him with access to confidential information.”120 The
misappropriation theory bars only “trading on the basis of
information that the wrongdoer converted to his own use in
violation of some fiduciary, contractual, or similar obligation
to the owner or rightful possessor of the information.121
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Elements of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5’s Violation Under
Misappropriation Theory.

The Supreme Court in O’Hagan emphasized three elements: (1)
deceptive conduct of material nonpublic information, (2) in connection with a
securities transaction, and (3) scienter and willfulness in criminal action.122
The Court affirmed and endorsed the criminal liability under Section 10(b) on
the misappropriation theory.123 The court held that liability under
misappropriation theory meant that a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violation
occurred when an outsider traded based on nonpublic, confidential information
in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of the information, rather than
to the person with whom he traded.124 O’Hagan emphasized that section 10(b)
liability requires deceptive conduct of material nonpublic information, in
connection with a securities transaction, and scienter.125
i.

First Element: Deceptive Conduct

The Supreme Court defined deception as “[a] fiduciary who pretends
loyalty to the principal while secretly converting the principal’s information
for personal gain dupes or defrauds the principal.”126 So, if the fiduciary
informed the source of information that he planned to trade based on secret
information he had, there is no deceptive device and, consequently, the liability
under misappropriation theory will be foreclosed because there is no
“deceptive device.”127
ii.

Second Element: In Connection with the Purchase or Sale of
Security

The misappropriation’s deceptive use must be “in connection with the
purchase or sale of securit[y],” which means that information had to be used
in purchasing or selling securities and not for any other uses.128 In SEC v.
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Clark,129 the court said Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 do not proscribe all
frauds occurring in the business world, only those “in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.”130
iii.

Third Element: Scienter and Willfulness in Criminal Action

Scienter is a required element in every case involving fraud that
esteems from the common law and Rule 10b-5 adopts that element whether
the SEC or U.S. attorney brings the insider trading case.131 However, in
prosecuting insider trading, criminally proving willfulness conduct is required
in addition to scienter.132 The United States Supreme Court defined Scienter in
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder as “a mental state embracing intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud.”133
The Supreme Court in O’Hagan concluded that misappropriation
theory was consistent with the statute and precedent and establishing criminal
violation of Rule 10b-5 under the misappropriation theory would require
proving the presence of culpable intent (scienter), which means that the
defendant “willfully” and with knowledge of Rule 10b-5 committed the
violation.134 The defendant will not be imprisoned if he can prove his lack of
knowledge of the rule.135
Hence, the scienter element is necessary to prove violation of Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.136 Negligence will not suffice to constitute a violation
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5; however, actual intent will satisfy this
element.137 The overwhelming majority of the circuit courts concluded that
recklessness is also enough in non-criminal cases.138 Some courts established
a three elements formula for scienter of an insider trading case.139 The three
elements are actual knowledge of nonpublic, material information, knowledge
that the information was undisclosed, and knowledge that the information was
material.140 If the liability of insider trading was based on the misappropriation
theory, the tippee must also know that the tipper disclosed the inside,
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SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 665–66.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id. at 666.
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Wang & Steinberg, supra note 17, at 42.
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Id.; see SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1983).
140
MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47.
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nonpublic information on a breach of fiduciary duty to the source of
information.141
B. The Concept of Tipping Under Dirks v. SEC142 (1983) and Salman
v. United States143 (2016)144
Tipping occurs when an insider passes on information that he knows is
material and nonpublic to an outsider, in violation of a fiduciary duty to the
issuer or the source of the information.145 The United States Supreme Court
established a test for securities fraud responsibility of the person who receives
material, nonpublic information in Dirks and reaffirmed this test in Salman v.
United States.146 We are going to define the concept of tipping and the element
of personal benefits.
1.

Tipping Under Dirks v. SEC (1983)

The United States Supreme Court in Dirks v. SEC extended the
liability of insider trading to the temporary employee or agent of the
corporation and to persons “called tippees” and made them obliged under the
disclose or abstain rule.147 A tippee is a person who receives information from
the “tipper” in breach of fiduciary duty to shareholders.148 The court made it
clear that if a tippee trades on nonpublic information received from an insider
or someone who, in turn, received it from an insider “tipper,” and the “tippee”
knows that the information was disclosed in violation of the tipper’s fiduciary
duty, he might be found liable for committing insider trading under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b-5.149 The Court defined tippees as “those individuals who
trade securities of a company while in possession of material, nonpublic
information about that company (a “tip”) that was conveyed by a corporate
insider in violation of his fiduciary duty to the company’s shareholders.”150
That means the tippee, by obtaining the tip, will inherit a derivative obligation
141
142
143

O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 673–78.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).

Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
We did not discuss tipping as a classical theory problem and
misappropriation problem separately. When the tipper violates a fiduciary duty to the
issuer, this will be a classical theory of insider trading, and when the tipper violates a
duty to the source of information, that will be misappropriation theory. Many times,
the two theories come together because when a tipper violates a fiduciary duty to the
issuer, the issuer is also the source of information.
145
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1978).
146
137 S. Ct. at 420.
147
DoNagy, supra note 49, at 1317.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 472 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), aff’d
in part, rev’d in part, 635 F.2d 156 (2d Cir. 1980).
144
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of fiduciary duty to the company’s shareholders from the tipper, and that
obligation requires the tippee to adhere to the disclose or abstain rule, same as
the insider. The question before the Supreme Court was whether or not Dirks,
as a tippee, violated anti-fraud laws by disclosing the material information he
received from the tipper to his clients. 151
The Court set an objective criterion in Dirks saying “the tippee” would
be held liable under the disclose or abstain rule if the “tip” breached a fiduciary
duty and that breach occurred for the sake of personal benefits.152 Since the
insurance company former insider (the tipper) did not breach his fiduciary duty
to the company’s shareholders by providing insider information to the tippee,
the tippee does not inherit the duty to disclose or abstain and there is no
derivative breach. 153
The Court said that determining if a disclosure is a breach of duty
depends, in large part, on the purpose of the disclosure, which means scienter
is an independent element of a Rule 10b-5 violation under classical theory. 154
The Court said not all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a
securities transaction come within the ambit of Rule 10b–5.155 The tipper may
disclose inside information, but still act consistently with his fiduciary duty.156
For instance, if the tipper does not anticipate that the tippee will trade on the
basis of disclosed information or the tipper does not recognize that the tip is
material and may constitute nonpublic information.
So, the manipulation or deception element is required to constitute
unfairness when the insider takes advantage of information intended to be
available only for a corporation’s purposes. The tippee’s responsibility must
be related back to the insider’s responsibility by showing that the tippee knew
that the information was given to him in breach of a fiduciary duty to the
stockholder (under classical theory) or to the source of information (under
misappropriation theory).157
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or
abstain, it is necessary to determine whether the insider’s “tip” constitutes a
breach of the insider’s fiduciary duty.158
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Id. at 661.
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Dirks adopted—but read it differently than SEC—the Cady,
Roberts159 formulation of the breach of duty in which the transmission of
information that was made available only for a corporate purpose for personal
benefits, with the intent and knowledge that the individual is going to trade.
The Dirks court also emphasized the Chiarella ruling saying that there
can be no duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside
information “was not [the corporation’s] agent . . . was not a fiduciary, [or]
was not a person in whom the sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust
and confidence.”160 This does not mean the tippee is free to trade. The tippee
might inherit the tipper’s liability if the tip was in breach of the tipper’s
fiduciary liability. Since the tip does not breach the former insider fiduciary
obligation to the insurance company, petitioner—Dirks—who received the
material, nonpublic information from an “insider” of a corporation with which
he had no connection, does not inherit the insider liability.161 Besides, the
tipper was motivated by a desire to expose fraud, received no monetary or
personal benefit from revealing the information, and their purpose to make a
gift of valuable information to the petitioner.162 Thus, there was no actionable
violation of anti-fraud provisions of federal securities laws resulting from the
petitioner’s disclosure to his clients who relied on it in trading shares of the
corporation.163
2.

Why the Supreme Court Vacated Court of Appeal Dirks Finding of
Illegal Insider Trading:

First, from Ronald Secrist’s (the tipper’s) side, there was no
culpability in sharing the nonpublic information with Dirks because the tipper
believed that the information was transmitted for a proper purpose (exposing
the company fraud) and he did not receive or expect to receive a direct or
indirect personal benefit from his disclosure.164
Second, from Dirks’ side, initially he did not owe the company
stockholders a fiduciary duty and there is no fiduciary duty breach to be
inherited from the insider.165 Besides, the manipulative and deceptive element
were not clear from Dirks’ actions, it seems that the court interpreted Dirks’
disclosure to some of his clients as incidental in his main purpose of striving
159
In Re Cady & Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). In this case the court
held that the defendant tippees did not violate any fiduciary duties concerning stock
purchases where the SEC failed to prove that an insider revealed information for an
“improper purpose.” Id.
160
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 645.
161
Id. at 671–72.
162
Id. at 672.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 676.
165
Id. at 665.
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to expose fraudulent corporate practices.166 That means there is no scienter,
which is necessary to prove the violation of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.167
3.

Personal Benefits Test Under Dirks

The United State Supreme Court used the language of personal
benefits, personal gains, or personal advantage to hold the tipper liable of
insider trading and, consequently, the derivative responsibility of the tippee.168
In determining whether a tippee is under an obligation to disclose or abstain
from using nonpublic, material information received from an insider, the Court
said it depends on whether the insider himself has breached his Cady, Roberts
duty to shareholders in disclosing the nonpublic information to the tippee.169
Since the insider did not personally benefit, directly or indirectly, from his
disclosure, there has been no breach of duty to stockholders and, consequently,
there is no tippee derivative breach.170 Thus, the Dirks test is whether the
insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his disclosure.171
4.

Tipping Under Salman v. United States (2016)

Salman v. United States was the fourth Supreme Court insider trading
case after Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan. The Supreme Court endorsed and
outlined classical theory of insider trading in Chiarella.172 In Dirks, the
Supreme Court extended insider trading liability to the tippee and set a test for
the personal benefit element.173 Finally, in O’Hagan, the Court endorsed
misappropriation of insider trading.174
In Salman v. United States, the source of information was Maher Kara,
a former investment banker at Citigroup.175 Maher shared inside information
with his brother, Michael Kara, who, in turn, shared this information with his
friend and relative-by-marriage, Salman.176 Michael told Salman that the
source of information was his brother, Maher.177 Salman was indicted for
federal securities fraud crimes for trading on inside information.178 Maher
testified at Salman’s trial that he shared inside information with his brother,
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Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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Michael, to benefit him and expected him to trade on it.179 Michael testified to
sharing that information with Salman, who knew that it was from Maher.180
The main issue in the Salman case is that Maher, the initial tipper, did not
receive any pecuniary benefits from his tips as the Dirks test requires.181
5.

In Salman v. United States, the Supreme Court Abrogated Second
Circuit Ruling

The Supreme Court in Salman v. United States did not follow the
minority ruling set by the Second Circuit in United States v. Newman,182 and
reaffirmed Dirks and rules that Maher breached his duty of trust and
confidence to Citigroup and its clients, he was under the duty of trust and
confidence of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 and he shall not tip inside
corporate information to others who he knows will trade on his tips.183 Further,
Maher personally benefited by making a gift of inside corporate information
to his brother.184 The facts even stated that Maher asked his brother Michael
why he needed the information.185 Michael answered he owed someone
money.186 The Supreme Court read this as quid pro quo of the gift.187 Michael
substituted money and turned down Maher’s money offer, preferring the
information.188 The Court found this a sufficient personal benefit for the tipper,
and his advantage was that he was able to give a gift with someone else’s
property, so the tip saved him money.189 Further, Salman committed securities
fraud by trading on an insider tip in disregard of his knowledge that the tipper’s
tip violated his fiduciary duty under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.190
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Id.
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Id. at 422.
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In United States v. Newman, the Second Circuit held that a “gift” of
inside information could not be sufficient to plead insider trading unless there is
‘‘proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship’’ between tipper and tippee that
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature. See Nicole Vanatko, The
Latest Chapter in Insider Trading Law: Major Circuit Decision Expands Scope of
Liability for Trading on a “Tip”, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE (2017),
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The Court also rules that scienter and willfulness from the tipper’s side
exist when there are beliefs, anticipation, knowledge, or understanding that the
tippee will trade based on the inside information.191
6.

Can a Gift Suffice the Personal Gains Test?

Dirks answered, yes. “The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation
of nonpublic information also exist when an insider makes a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”192 Dirks’ language is
extremely specific in determining when it would be proper to convict for
insider trading when an insider makes a gift of confidential information.
Tippers do not have to receive a monetary or tangible personal benefit, it does
not have to be quid pro quo from the tippee to the tipper, but it will be sufficient
when the tipper makes a gift to the tippee and, in particular, a relative or
friend.193 However, the personal benefit element does not include accidentally
or unwillingly transferring information and, in this circumstance, the tippee
might be liable if the other elements of the violation exist.
Final Thoughts in Understanding Insider Trading and the Legal Justification
of Prohibition
The main difference between insider trading liability under classical
and misappropriation theory is that:
The two theories are complementary, each addressing efforts
to capitalize on nonpublic information through the purchase
or sale of securities. The classical theory targets a corporate
insider’s breach of duty to shareholders with whom the insider
transacts; the misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the
basis of nonpublic information by a corporate “outsider” in
breach of a duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source
of the information.194
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Id. at 423.
Dirks, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983). The petitioner lawyer defended this
understanding saying these are dictum and the holding is far different and dictum
shall not be used to be the basis for criminal liability, the supreme court justice
responded on the bench and said “[b]ut it is not a dictum when it says thus the test is
whether the insider personally will benefit directly or indirectly from his disclosure.”
Id.
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In other words, “The offense in classical theory is on the person who transacted
with the insider, while in misappropriation theory the offense is on the source
of the material nonpublic information.”195
If banning insider trading increases market efficiency and there is a public
interest in attaining efficiency of securities markets, it becomes a public
interest issue. Protecting that public interest from violation makes the violation
a public-order crime, which can be defined as a “crime which involves acts
that interfere with the operations of society and the ability of people to function
efficiently.”196 There is no doubt that the stock market nowadays is the
backbone of the financial systems of many countries, including the United
States. If there is any interference with the soundness of the operation of that
market, the entire society will be affected, even for those who did not own
securities.197 Hence, insider trading should be prohibited because it is a publicorder crime.
Rule14e-3 is a specific insider trading rule adopted by the SEC that only
applies in the context of tender offer and this paper does not discuss that
specific insider trading rule.198

195

Donna Nagy, Securities Regulations Class Spring 2018, Ind. L. J.
(referencing O’Hagan 521 U.S. at 642). “Under the ‘traditional’ or ‘classical theory’
of insider trading liability, a violation of § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 occurs when a
corporate insider trades in his corporation’s securities on the basis of material,
confidential information he has obtained by reason of his position. Such trading
qualifies as a ‘deceptive device’ because there is a relationship of trust and
confidence between the corporation’s shareholders and the insider . . .
‘misappropriation theory’ urged by the [g]overnment here, a corporate ‘outsider’
violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 when he misappropriates confidential information
for securities trading purposes, in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to the source of
the information, rather than to the persons with whom he trades.” Id.
196.
Larry J. Siegel, CRIMINOLOGY: THEORIES, PATTERNS, & TYPOLOGIES,
(9th ed. 2006).
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See J. William Hicks, International Dimensions of U.S. Securities Law
(2018) (“There is a public interest in national property resources so the long-term
financial security of its important resources, also has interest in capital availability
which secure flow of new capital into private enterprise, and public has interest in
economic health . . . 1929 and 1987 market crash proved that there is a relationship
between securities market and the nation as a whole.”).
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For a detailed analysis for Rule14e-3, see Jesse M. Fried, Insider
Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers, 67 U. CHI. L. REV.
421 (2000).
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C. Criminalization Under Egyptian Capital Market Law, Express
Statutory Prohibition Not Defined as Fraud.
1.

Background on the Egyptian Legal System and its Stock Market:

Islamic law and Napoleonic Code, which in turn derived its principles
from Islamic law,199 formed the origins of the Egyptian legal system.200 Egypt
is a civil law country, which means a court’s ruling is built on codes and
administrative orders, not on case law as in the United States. However,
previous judicial decisions of higher courts do have persuasive authority,201
especially when the laws governing the dispute at hand are elastic. The most
related securities law in the Egyptian legal system are: Companies Law No.
159 of 1981, the Capital Market Law No. 95 of 1992 and its Executive
Regulation, the Law of Non-Banking Financial Markets No. 10 of 2009,
Central Depository Law No. 93 of 2000, related executive orders of the
chairman of Egyptian Stock Exchange, and related orders of the chairman of
Financial Regulatory Authority. Article 27 of Capital Market Law (CML) 95
of 1992 allows for the establishment of Egyptian and foreign securities
companies conducting one or more of the following activities:202
(1) Underwriting of subscriptions;
(2) Participation in the establishment of companies issuing securities;
(3) Venture capital;
(4) Clearing and settling of securities;
(5) Forming and managing securities portfolios and mutual funds;
(6) Acting as brokerage firms;
(7) Securitization; and
(8) Direct investment including hedge fund.203
199
See La Civilisation des arabes et l’étude scientifique de l’histoire, Revue
Scientifique, 1er décembre 1883. It says that when Napoleon Bonaparte was in
Egypt, he took a book for the Islamic Mālikī school and developed his
“Napoleonic Code” on the basis of that Islamic school jurisprudence. Id.
200
Ahmed Y. Zohny, Suitability of US Security Laws and Regulations to
Serve as a Model Law for Egyptian Financial Markets, 15 ARAB L. Q. 5 (2000).
201
For more details about Egyptian law, Court System, and government
branches see Mohamed S. E. Abdel Wahab, An Overview of the Egyptian Legal
System and Legal Research, GLOBALEX (2012)
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Egypt1.html. For more details about
Egyptian laws affecting economic activity see Radwa S. Elsaman, Doing Business in
Egypt After the January Revolution: Capital Market and Investment Laws, 11 RICH.
J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 43 (2011), http://scholarship.richmond.edu/global/vol11/iss1/3.
202
Law No. 95 of 1992 (L aw of Capital Market); Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya
Adad 10 mokrer-h, March 14, 2018 (Egypt).
203
Added by the order of the Ministry of Investment and International
Cooperation no. 113 for 2018, item 4 of the order regulates hedge fund saying,
“direct investment company may add up the hedge fund activities to its purposes.”
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Under Egyptian securities regulations, there are civil, administrative,
and criminal sanctions for securities fraud, and several entities are authorized
to enforce these sanctions. Law No. 120 for 2008 established “Economic
Courts” as a special court to quickly resolve business disputes and to guarantee
adjudicating this kind of case through an experienced judge.
To unify the supervisory authority over the entire Egyptian nonbanking financial markets, Article 3 of Law No. 10 of 2009 replaced the
Capital Market Authority with the Financial Regulatory Authority (FRA)204 to
be in charge of enforcing the provisions of CML 95 of 1992. The FRA is an
independent surveillance authority over the Egyptian stock market. Under
Rule 902(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, Egyptian Exchange (EGX) is an
offshore securities market.205
The Capital Markets Law No. 95 of 1992 and its Executive Regulation
did not define explicitly what constitutes a security. At this point, Egyptian
commercial law or any related law will be applicable to define what constitute
securities. Some argue that declining to define securities is a wise and
pragmatic approach taken by the Egyptian legislator to expand the coverage of
securities for its growing market.206
The Egyptian legislature appeals to the principle of honesty, which is
very much drawn from Islamic law and describes activities that are not in
conformity with principles of honesty.207
Article 63 of the CML provides a wide anti-fraud provision to
criminalize any activities that might affect the integrity and efficiency of the
Egyptian stock market. It criminalizes practicing any activity of the capital
market without being licensed or going beyond the scope of the license, public
offering of any securities in violation of the CML, misstatement or omission
of material information either when dealing with government officials or the
trading public, and listing securities in stock exchange in violation of stock
market regulations.

204
We may also refer to FRA by Egyptian Financial Supervision Authority
(EFSA). See Explanatory, FIN. REG. AUTHORITY,
http://www.fra.gov.eg/content/efsa_en/efsa_pages_en/efsa_clarification_en.htm (last
visited Mar. 26, 2020).
205
See Letter from Paul M. Dudek, Chief, Office of Int’l Corp. Fin., to Dr.
Sameh El Torgoman, Chairman, Cairo & Alexandria Stock Exchs. (Apr. 16, 2003)
(available at https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/cairo041603.htm).
206
See Zohny, supra note 200.
207
Id.
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Article 17 of the CML stipulated that listed securities must be traded
on the stock exchange, and any sale that occurred outside of it would be
deemed void.
The Executive Regulation of the CML stipulated that securities
transactions on the stock exchange must be executed through a brokerage firm.
Article 89 of the CML executive regulation enumerates the conditions that
should be satisfied on any broker, which includes a good reputation and never
being convicted of a crime that negates his honor or integrity. The executive
regulation also established a responsibility for the Egyptian Exchange to
oversee its employees and to report any violations to the FSA. Article 90
thereafter explained the brokerage firm duties from the moment it receives the
customer’s order, prohibited any action that may cause damage to transacted
persons, and forbid the execution of transactions for its own account.208
Toward a new financial reform plan, in February 2018, the Egyptian
Parliament approved amendments to the CML. The amendments established a
legislative framework for the Sukuk market in Egypt, created an exchange for
trading in derivatives (including futures, options, and swaps), and expanded
the scope of criminal violations under the CML. The Egyptian capital market
became more active because of the overall increased attractiveness of
investment in Egypt after floating the Egyptian pound in November 2016, and
there are many relatively big initial public offerings (IPOs) going on.209 The
World Bank report for 2018 referred to positive developments in the Egyptian
market. For instance, Egypt strengthened minority investors’ protections by
increasing corporate transparency, improving one-stop shopping, and making
it easier to start a new business.210
2.

Statutory Prohibition of Insider Trading Under Egyptian Law

In comparison to the United States, Egyptian insider trading law has
enough of a parity of information prohibition similar to the system in the
United States prior to 1980 when the Supreme Court decided Chiarella. That
means Egyptian law currently adopts the Second Circuit ruling in SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co.211 that bars any person in possession of material nonpublic
information from trading or tipping.

208
Minister of Economics and Foreign Trade Decree No. 135 of 1993
(Executive Regulations of the Capital Market Law), Al Jarida’ al-Rasmiyya, art. 90
(vol. 81 F. no. 8 1993) (Egypt).
209
Al Tamimi & Company, Equity Capital Markets in Egypt, LEXOLOGY
(Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=07fb3eaa-db1f45ac-b050-193888f847a6.
210
WORLD BANK GROUP, DOING BUSINESS 17, 19 (16th ed. 2019).
211
SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d. Cir. 1968). The United
States Supreme Court in Chiarella refused the Second Circuit ruling and emphasized
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Article 64 of the Egyptian CML (translated from Arabic) stipulates
that:
Without prejudice to any heavier penalty stipulated in any
other law; imprisonment for a term not less than two years and
a fine of not less than fifty thousand Egyptian pounds
(LE.50,000) or the amount of realized gains or avoided loss
and not exceed twenty million (LE. 20,000,000) or the greater
of twice the amount of realized gains or the avoided loss, or
either penalty shall be inflicted on whomsoever divulges
inside information received by virtue of his duties according
to the provisions of this law, or benefits whether himself, his
spouse, or his children, or inserts material misstatement in his
official reports, or disregards any material information, to the
extent that it affects the results of such reports, or trade on
securities in violation of the provisions of Article No. 20
(Mokrer)212 of this law.213
In turn, Article No. 20 (Mokrer) of the CML added by Law No. 123
for 2008 states
It shall be prohibited for any person who have on his position
material nonpublic information which could impact the status
of any listed company to trade on its stock before this
information became public, and it is also prohibited to tip or
disclose this nonpublic information to any person directly or
indirectly, the Executive Regulation of this law and stock
exchange listing regulations shall determine what constitute a
material nonpublic information.214
Article 319 of the Executive Regulation defined what might constitute
material information, inside information, insiders, and insider trading as
follows:215
B) Material information: A single piece or set of information that might have
actual impact on listed stocks prices, had actual impact on investment
decisions of investors, or had an effect on market transactions of stocks.
that there is no express disclose or abstain obligation—it all goes to the fiduciary
duty.
212
Mokrer is an Arabic term that means bis, reiterated, or repeated.
213
Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya
Adad 10 mokrer-h (2018) (Egypt).
214
Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya
Adad 23 mokrer-A (2008) (Egypt).
215
Executive Regulations of Law No. 95 of 1992, added by the minster of
Investment order no. 141 for 2006.
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Material information becomes public information once it is equally accessible
to the trading public, in light of stock exchange disclosing rules.
C) Inside information: Any material, nonpublic information about listed
companies’ activities or one of its related entities.
D) Insider: “Any person who has access to information about the company
or its issued securities, by virtue of which he can benefit from it himself or
through someone else, whether this access to information has been done
legally, or illegally, and whether he himself has accessed this information, or
it has come to his knowledge through someone else in one way or another,
directly or indirectly.”216 Benefiting from inside information is subject to the
crimination of Article (64) of the CML.
H) Insider trading: Where any person who has directly or indirectly benefited
himself or someone else from trading or using inside information, and the
beneficiary of the inside information will be considered or deemed to have
benefited from inside information in accordance with the statutory prohibition
of Article (64) of the CML.
According to Article 324, “[i]t shall not be considered insider trader
whoever trade on securities because of any reason not connected directly or
indirectly to the inside information.” 217
3.

Examining Insider Trading Statutory Prohibition Under Egyptian
Law

The first chapter made it crystal clear that the U.S. system of law
defines illegal insider trading as a fraud. However, in Egypt, we have criminal
insider trading. It is market abuse. The Egyptian CML explicitly criminalizes
insider trading, and the law provides the criminal authority to prosecute insider
trading.218
In examining the above series of provisions, we will see that Article
64 of the CML sets sanctions for stock market violations that might be
committed by governmental officials or any person (permanently or
temporarily) hired to provide services for the issuing corporation who, by
“virtue of his [or her] duties,” knows nonpublic information. The first part of
Article 64 prohibited disclosing corporate inside information for any reason
216

Id.
Id.
218
What distinguishes fraud-based illegality from criminal prohibition is
that in fraud there are elements like a material non-disclosure in the face of an
affirmative duty to disclose and reliance. In criminal prohibition, the law explicitly
prohibits and defines the prosecution authority.
217
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and not just for trading purposes, as if the disclosure made to benefit the
issuer’s competitive in a certain market. However, the last sentence of Article
64 says “or traded on securities in violation of the provisions of Article No. 20
(Mokrer) of this law.” This part of the prohibition of insider trading might not
encompass all insider trading violations because the language suggests that it
is meant to address stock exchange officials, Financial Regulatory Authority,
rating companies, or any person empowered by stock market law to have
access to a corporation’s nonpublic information. In other words, Article 64
proposes to incriminate officials and temporary insiders for insider trading.
Yet, it does not expressly prohibit insider trading that might be committed by
any person who is not a government official nor a permanent or temporary
insider.
So, the question is, would someone like Chiarella or O’Hagan that is
not an insider of the company whose securities had been traded on basis of
nonpublic information, would they fall within article 64? It seems no because
they were hired to provide services for the issuing corporation. In O’Hagan
Case Pillsbury was the issuing corporation but O’Hagan law firm worked for
Grand Metropolitan. In application to the Egyptian law, O’Hagan would not
be covered under Article 64 of the Egyptian CML executive regulation, but he
would be liable under Article 20 which seems broader.
This gap in legislation might be filled by Article No. 20 (Mokrer) of
the CML in its use of the term “any person.” However, this language does not
properly address the offense of insider trading because the legislature
improperly inserted terms to define materiality of information and to show
causation of prohibition. The article specifically identifies “any person who
has a material nonpublic information which could impact the status of any
listed company to trade on its stock before this information became public . . .
.” Using the phrase “impact the status of any listed company” suggests that the
cause of prohibition is not to disadvantage the listed corporation. That might
be interpreted to mean that if the corporation is not itself injured, insider
trading is not prohibited. However, Article No. 20 (Mokrer) clearly prohibited
tipping inside information and also made a reference to the Executive
Regulation of the CML to define materiality of information.
4.

Prohibition of Insider Trading on the Executive Regulation of the
CML

Article 319 of the Executive Regulation of the CML adequately
addressed insider trading; it is a broad parity of information rule.219 The
language directly defined what might constitute material information by
219
This paper did not address the constitutionality of the legislation
mechanism of promulgating executive regulation which adds criminalization to the
CML through a ministerial decree.
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connecting it to an objective test: when the information has an actual impact
on the stock’s prices. Article 319 in item (D) had broad disclosure or abstain
rules and expresses prohibition the same as pre-Chiarella. Item (D) adequately
defined who is an insider and did not restrict its scope for corporate fiduciaries
or government officials. Instead, it used the term “any person” to allow insider
trading prohibitions to apply to any person who came into possession of inside
information, disregarding the legality of the source of the information, and
subjected the violator to Article 64 of the sanction.
Article 319 of the Executive Regulation in item (E) clearly defined
insider trading and its scope. The language includes those who benefit
themselves or someone else from trading on the basis of material, nonpublic
information. Benefits do not have to be pecuniary personal benefits. They
could be other personal benefits, direct or indirect, whether for oneself or
someone else. This means Egyptian insider trading regulation does not have
the Dirks v. SEC and Salman v. United States personal benefit issue. Item (E)
even established a presumption to satisfy the personal benefit test by saying
that benefiting someone else without any personal direct or indirect benefits
would be sufficient to charge someone with insider trading under Article (64)
of the CML.
The Executive Regulation of the CML in Article 324 guaranteed the
disclaimer right for any person charged with insider trading to negate
culpability if the reason for his or her transaction was for other reasons and not
on the basis of insider trading. This article ruling exactly resembles the Rule
10b-5-1 “knowing possession” requirement in American law.220
5.

Insider trading prohibition for portfolio management and brokerage
companies

The Executive Regulation of the CML in chapter six determined the
obligations of portfolio management and brokerage companies towards their
clients, which include obligations of:
Article 214 stipulated that the company in execution of its licensed
activities shall adhere to the principles of honesty, justice, equity, and due
diligence. 221

220

See Donna M. Nagy, The “Possession vs. Use” Debate in the Context of
Securities Trading by Traditional Insiders: Why Silence Can Never Be Golden,
ARTICLES BY MAURER FAC. 1129 (1999).
221
Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiyya
Adad 10 mokrer-h, March 14, 2018 (Egypt),
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Article 231 prohibited portfolio management or brokerage companies
from selective disclosure and any direct or indirect discriminatory disclosure
between their clients. 222
Article 244 of section five of chapter six of the executive regulation
expressly prohibited insider trading. It states:
Neither the owner of the portfolio management or brokerage
companies nor any of its directors or employees shall transact
on securities on basis of a secret information that is not
publicly disclosed for the market or accessible for the trading
public, even if this information or data was incomplete or was
about a forthcoming transaction on these securities or any
material action might affect the securities, its issuer or its
prices.223
This article prohibits owners, directors, and employees of a portfolio
management company or brokerage companies from transacting on any
securities on the basis of nonpublic information.
However, Article 244 express prohibition came under chapter six of
the Executive Regulation of the CML.224 This chapter only regulates
companies established either to provide portfolio management or brokerage
services.225 It only prevents owners, directors, and employees (the “insiders”)
of these two types of companies from trading on securities on the basis of
nonpublic information received by virtue of their role in these businesses. Yet,
this prohibition does not completely address insider trading cases, as if one of
the three insiders mentioned did not trade or transact but tipped inside
information in related to securities transactions.
Hence, the insider trading prohibition of Article 244 of Executive
Regulation of CLM is not a comprehensive criminalization of insider trading
that might be committed by owners, directors, and employees of companies
that provide portfolio management and brokerage services. At this point, the
general provisions of insider trading might be applicable to fill the gap of
chapter six as in the second example below.
6.

Egyptian court’s insider trading ruling

The Egyptian Criminal Courts fill gaps where the insider trading laws
fall short. Cairo Criminal Misdemeanors Court convicted the regional manager
of American Express Bank in Cairo for insider trading because he traded based
222
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on material, nonpublic information for personal benefit.226 The facts say that
an Egyptian-American Bank planned to sell a large number of its outstanding
shares, and the American Express regional manager knew about this plan
because they owned 40% of the outstanding shares of Egyptian American
Bank (the issuer).227 The regional manager received this information by virtue
of his job at American Express.228 Therefore, he was an insider according to
Article (64) of the CML and should not have traded based on this inside
information.229
Also, the Cairo criminal court for financial crimes convicted the
chairman and managing director of a brokerage firm under Articles 64 and
68230 of the CML because he disclosed nonpublic information about the stock
trading sessions, which came to his knowledge by virtue of his role at the
brokerage firm. The Egyptian State Council affirmed this ruling on appeal and
ruled to discharge the defendant from his chair at the brokerage firm for lack
of honesty and trust, which is a required character trait to be a key employee
in a company.231
III.

ENFORCEMENT AND CHARGING FOR INSIDER TRADING

A. Securities and Exchange Commission in the American Legal System
1.

Securities enforcement law

In the United States, the enforcement of securities regulations takes at
least five forms: (1) Private litigation through courts or by arbitration where
the plaintiff petitions for damages, contract rescission and/or equitable relief;
(2) SEC enforcement action in administrative proceedings; (3) SEC
enforcement action in judicial proceedings; (4) Criminal action by the United
States Department of Justice (DOJ) in federal courts; and (5) Self Regulated
Organization (SRO)232 action to sanction its members for violations of its

226

Cairo Criminal Misdemeanors Court, financial circuit, case no. 400 for
2005 ordered January 31, 2005.
227
Id.
228
Id.
229
Cairo Criminal Misdemeanors Court, financial circuit, case no. 400 for
2005 ordered January 31, 2005; Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), supra
note 221.
230
Id. The actual manager of the company shall be liable to the penalties
specified in the provisions of this Law for violations committed. Id. The company
assets shall, in all cases, warrant the payment of the fines. Id.
231
Cairo Financial Criminal Court, financial misdemeanors circuit, case no.
976 for 2004.
232
See Troy Segal, How Does FINRA Differ from the SEC?, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/how-does-finra-differ-sec/ (updated on
Apr. 23, 2018). FINRA is the largest SRO in the securities industry in the United
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rules.233 The DOJ is the only prosecuting authority for securities criminal
violations through the United States Attorney’s Office.234 The DOJ often
initiates its securities criminal investigations and prosecutions through SEC
referrals.235 The SEC derives its investigation powers from sections 20(a) and
8(e) of the Securities Act, sections 21(a)(1)236 and (2) of the Exchange Act,
section 209(a) of the Advisers Act, and Investment Company Act section
42(a).237 These provisions and federal court rulings give the SEC the authority,
in its discretion, to develop an investigation of particular activities.238 During
its preliminary investigation, SEC staff may identify certain corporate
personnel or officers to interview or to present certain information, and
knowingly and willfully providing false information is a crime.239 The
Supreme Court held in Securities & Exchange Commission v. Jerry T.
O'Brien240 that the SEC decisions from informal investigation, formal
investigation, bringing a case, or making settlements are considered
“administrative investigations” and its findings are not binding.241
2.

Inside the SEC

In the wake of the stock market crash in 1929, Congress held hearings
to investigate related securities regulations to identify the reasons for the
problem and to address them adequately. Based on these hearings, Congress
passed the Securities Act of 1933 and the Exchange Act of 1934 as federal
States and is a not-for-profit entity. Id. An SRO is a membership-based organization
that creates and enforces rules for members based on federal laws. See id.
233
See J. William Hicks, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. SECURITIES
LAW (2018).
234
U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, 9-27.000 - PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
PROSECUTION, https://www.justice.gov/jm/jm-9-27000-principles-federalprosecution (last updated Feb. 2018).
235
Id.
236
U.S. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1)
(2018). “The Commission may, in its discretion, make such investigations as it
deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated, is violating, or is
about to violate any provision of this chapter . . . The Commission is authorized in its
discretion, to publish information concerning any such violations, and to investigate
any facts, conditions, practices, or matters which it may deem necessary or proper to
aid in the enforcement of such provisions… .” Id.
237
Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77h(e), 77t(a) (2018); Security
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (2018); Investment Advisers Act of
1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b–9(a) (2018); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §
80a–41(a) (2018).
238
Id.
239
Ralph C. Ferrara & Philip S. Khinda, SEC Enforcement Proceedings:
Strategic Consideration for when the Agency Comes Calling, 51 ADMIN. L. REV.
1143 (1999).
240
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Jerry T. O'Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 742
(1984).
241
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legislation to govern the secondary market of securities.242 The Exchange Act
created the Securities and Exchange Commission to enforce the newly passed
securities law with the main responsibility of protecting investors, maintaining
fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitating capital formation.243
The SEC oversees the key participants in the securities market,
including securities exchanges, securities brokers and dealers, investment
advisors, and mutual funds. The SEC uses its enforcement authority to protect
the stock market from securities violations, especially securities fraud.
The SEC still faces some challenges to meet its responsibilities
concerning the stock market. The U.S. securities market is incredibly active,244
and unlawful trading strategies are becoming more complex and are difficult
to identify, as identification requires analysis of large datasets. That challenge
requires even more resources to meet the increasing caseload, and a mass of
digital information needs advanced technology to penetrate this changing
landscape.245 Insider trading cases expose not just the advanced technical
means by which violators obtain secret information, but the lengths and hard
paths they take to avoid being caught.246 That, in turn, stretches the SEC
enforcement scope responsibility into newer areas. The SEC enforcement
actions included actions against IT professionals, hackers who misappropriate
corporate data, and providers of political intelligence.247 The SEC prosecutes
civil enforcement suits in federal courts and initial administrative proceedings
within the SEC against any person or entities who violate the securities law.
248

242

15 U.S. Code § 77a; 15 U.S. Code § 78a.
See What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
https://www.sec.gov/Article/whatwedo.html (last visited on Mar. 25, 2020). The
responsibility of the Commission is to:
1.
interpret and enforce federal securities laws;
2.
issue new rules and amend existing rules;
3.
oversee the inspection of securities firms, brokers,
investment advisers, and ratings agencies;
4.
oversee private regulatory organizations in the securities,
accounting, and auditing fields; and
5.
coordinate U.S. securities regulation with federal, state,
and foreign authorities.
243
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See US Trading Volume By Quarter, ITG, https://www.itg.com/tradingvolume/quarter/. The number of trading shares of the U.S. stock market is over 130
Million share per day. Id.
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See NAGY ET AL., supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 685.
246
See Marc Fagel & Elizabeth Dooley, The Unrelenting Pace of SEC
Insider Trading Actions, GLOBAL INVESTIGATIONS REV. (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/article/1149624/the-unrelenting-pace-of-secinsider-trading-actions.
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Id.
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In 1984 Congress began to sharpen the SEC insider trading remedies.
Before 1984 the SEC could only seek an injunction, order disgorgement of
profits or refer the violator to the Justice Department to proceed with a criminal
prosecution.249 Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act to add another
penalty that the SEC can execute against insider trading violations.250 The
amended Securities Exchange Act authorizes the SEC to seek a civil penalty
of up to three times the amount of profits made or losses avoided by Rule 10b5 or 14e-3 violator in addition to any criminal fine ordered.251
In Fiscal Year 2017, the SEC brought 754 actions and won judgments
and orders of amount more than $3.7 billion in disgorgement and penalties.252
Further, the SEC returned $1.07 billion to harmed investors, suspended
securities of 309 companies, and barred or suspended 625 individuals.253
2.1.

Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 and
The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984

Congress passed the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement
Act of 1988 ("ITSFEA") to combat the increased insider trading misconduct
in the mid-1980s.254 The ITSFEA language reflects a strong desire to deter and
to sharpen the SEC enforcement weapons against insider trading.255 The main
provisions of ITSFEA includes the following:
1. ITSFEA Section 21A (a) (3) which submitted the person controlling
an insider trading violation for a civil monetary penalty if the
controlling person knows or recklessly disregarded the controlled
person insider trade offense.256

249

JAMES COX, ROBERT HILLMAN & DONALD LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES
REGULATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 941 (7th ed. 2013).
250
Congress’s policy of expanding the SEC enforcement tools reached all
other securities laws violations, the enforcement remedies and Penny Stock Reform
Act of 1990 expanded the sanctions available to empower the SEC with civil
penalties and administrative cease-and-desist orders besides its disciplinary authority
over market professionals. Id.
251
Id.
252
Annual Report A Look Back At Fiscal Year 2017, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH.
COMM’N DIV. OF ENF’T (last visited Mar. 23, 2020),
https://www.sec.gov/files/enforcement-annual-report-2017.pdf.
253
Id. at 3.
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Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, SECURITIES REGULATION CASES
AND ANALYSIS 381(4th ed. 2015).
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2. The ITSFEA embolden any person knows about insider trading
violation to tip the SEC in exchange of up to 10% for the penalty
collected.257
3. The ITSFEA confirmed the validity of the SEC insider trading tender
offer Rule 14e-3. Before ITSFEA commentators challenged the
validity of Rule 14e-3 questioning at what point the tender offer
actually exist to arise the cause of action for pre-offer activities under
Rule 14e-3.258 Further, does Rule 14e-3 survive the Supreme Court
ruling in Chiarella, which requires the pre-existence of a fiduciary
duty to disclose? Federal Courts rebutted the first challenge and
determined the scope of insider trading tender offer Rule 14e-3 to
include activities that follow the moment the target board consider the
tender offer proposal.259 Regarding the second challenge, ITSFEA
reflects Congres’s intent in granting the SEC more powerful authority
to combat and define fraud in Rule 14e-3. The ITSFEA grants the SEC
the authority to define what constitutes fraudulent conduct and to
adopt within its owns discretion the reasonable means to stop such
fraudulent practices.260
2.2.

Injunctions.

The enforcement of the securities laws often requires permanent
injunctions against violators to prevent future violations.261 Many provisions
like section 21 (A) of the Exchange Act, Section 20(b) of the Securities Act,
and Section 42 (d) of the Investment Company Act gives the SEC the authority
to seek a permanent or temporary injunction remedy against any person
engaged or about to engage in practices that constitute a violation of the
Exchange Act or other related securities law.262 Even though the issuance of
injunctions might seem “mild prophylactic,” its effect could be severe because
the SEC could build the injunction on “likelihood” grounds and past violations,
not actual new facts.263 The SEC often pray for relief in addition to the
injunction remedy, the SEC tailored the relief to be inconvenient to the
violation and violator circumstances. These remedies could take the form of

257

Id.
Howard M. Friedman, The Insider Trading and Sec. Fraud Enf’t Act of
1988, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 465 (1990), http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol68/iss3/2.
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O’Connor & Assocs. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. 529 F. Supp. 1179,
1192, 1193 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also Friedman, supra note Error! Bookmark not
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disgorgement of the ill-gotten profits,264 securities sale rescission, appointment
of a special counsel to carry out an inside investigation about the corporation
and its management, or to appoint an independent manager to the violated
company.265
3.

SEC Divisions

The SEC functions through five Divisions and twenty-three Offices.266
The Commission's staff are located in Washington and in eleven Regional
Offices throughout the country.267 These Divisions are:268
1. Division of Corporation Finance: Oversee corporate disclosure of
continuing and diperiodic information to the investing public.
2. Division of Trading and Markets: Enforce the SEC responsibility
for maintaining fair, orderly, and efficient markets.
3. Division of Investment Management: Protect and promote investors
interest on capital formation through oversight and regulation of
America's $66.8 trillion investment management industry.
4. Division of Enforcement: Prosecuting division that investigates
securities violations and recommends commencement of civil actions
in federal court or as administrative proceedings before an
administrative law judge. The staff of this division is composed of
1,452 attorneys, accountants, analysts and other professionals.269
5. Division of Economic and Risk Analysis: Its main responsibility is
to integrate robust economic analysis and rigorous data analytics into
the work of the SEC. Further, to educate and support investors to
function efficient markets by providing vital support in the form of
264

Disgorgement is not a penalty but is a kind of sanctions meant to prevent
unjust enrichment, yet when the amount of disgorgement exceeds the ill-gotten gains
deemed a penalty. See id.
265
Id. One of the SEC enforcement tools “Obey the Law” injunction orders,
the SEC utilize this mechanism to issue broad obey the securities law request, so any
future violation will give rise to an enforcement action.
266
Offices: Office of the General Counsel, Office of the Chief Accountant,
Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, Office of Credit Ratings, Office
of International Affairs, Office of Investor Education and Advocacy, Office of
Municipal Securities, Office of Ethics Counsel, Office of the Investor Advocate,
Office of Women and Minority Inclusion, Office of the Chief Operating Officer,
EDGAR Business Office, Office of Acquisitions, Office of Financial Management,
Office of Support Operations, Office of Human Resources, Office of Information
Technology, Office of Legislative and Intergovernmental Affairs, Office of Public
Affairs, Office of the Secretary, Office of Equal Employment Opportunity, Office of
the Inspector General, Office of Administrative Law Judges.
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SEC, https://www.sec.gov/.
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See Congressional Budget Justification FY 2017, U.S. SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION at 16 (2017),
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economic analyses through its website which includes EDGAR
database. Further, the division staff provide the economic analysis and
research, risk assessment, and data analytics.270

4.

The SEC Investigatory Process:

The SEC insider trading enforcement process is divided into four main
phases: “detection, preliminary investigation, formal investigation, and
prosecution.”271 The reason for empowering the SEC by enforcement authority
is that numerous regulatory provisions of the securities laws create problems
that might prevent a meaningful pursuit of violations by private plaintiffs.272
This is because of the nature of the regulations, which focus not on investor
protection as such, but rather in achieving desired efficiency and general
confidence in the market.273
5.1.

The SEC Detection, Preliminary Investigation, and Formal
Investigation

According to the Division of Enforcement’s Enforcement Manual,
processing a securities fraud investigation includes certain procedures,
including the following:274
The public can complain or tip the SEC through SEC’s online
website275 or by contacting any of the SEC’s offices. After assessing the
reliability of the tip, the complaint or the referral the staff processes it
according to the SEC manual.276 The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act established a Whistleblower Award Program for any
person who provides information that results in monetary sanctions of over $1
million on a successful enforcement action, which awards a person 10-30% of
the total monetary sanctions.277
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Andrew P. Van Osselaer, Insider Trading Enforcement & Link
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James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An
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SEC, DIVISION OF ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL (2017),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf.
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The SEC Division of Enforcement, in ranking its investigations
policies, devotes more resources to investigate cases deemed “National
Priority Matters.”278 In order to classify an investigation as a National Priority
Matter, they consider some criteria such as (1) deterrence for a potentially
widespread misconduct; (2) the position occupied by the violator; (3) whether
there is a violation of newly-enacted legislation; (4) the riskiness of the
misconduct for investors or important sector of the market; and (5) whether
the matter affects a significant number of potential or vulnerable victims.279
Based on those criteria and the type of violation, the Division of Enforcement
handles some referrals with great care as if the case is related to Bank Secrecy
or the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.280
After receiving a tip or a referral, a staff member searches–in light of
the Division procedures and the Assistant Director’s guidance—the
potentiality of executing a successful enforcement case.281 If the staff reaches
a positive possibility of successful investigation, she signs into a Hub system
and recommends opening a Matters Under Inquiry (MUI) and also suggests
the office that should process the MUI for the sake of achieving the best use
of the resources of the Division.282 The MUI is then either closed or converted
to an investigation, and the staff in consultation with the Associate Director or
the Unit Chief will determine the fate of the MUI.283 If it is turned into an
investigation, securities law authorizes the SEC and its officers to issue
subpoenas for a witness to present a document or to take a testimony under
oath.284 In some urgent cases, the Commission delegates to one of the staff
members to act on their own discretion on the Commission’s behalf as a Duty
Officer.285
The SEC in administrative proceedings can bar a person from
association with a broker-dealer or investment adviser if there was a civil or
criminal conviction against him.286 The SEC encourages its staff to close an
investigation when it becomes apparent that no further steps can be taken.287
The staff member should consider the seriousness of violations, resources
available for investigation, the strength of the evidence, who will be harmed if
he decides to close, and the age of the violation when he decides the proper

278
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proceeding of the investigation.288 Closing an investigation will be followed
by termination notices to be sent to every person who was involved in the
investigation.289 Successful enforcement action cannot be closed unless all
enforcement is completed either by a final judgment or Commission order and
after paying the monetary relief in full.290
The SEC, under certain considerations, may continue its own
investigations even if there is ongoing SEC litigation. This investigation
requires an independent good-faith basis as if there is a possibility to add to
the litigation additional violators.291 The SEC adopts a clear policy in its
dealing with the press and how to ask for production of documents or
information. SEC staff must begin with informal channels first to obtain the
information or the documents in hands of the media member entity.292 If the
negotiations do not succeed, an assessment will be taken before seeking
issuance of a subpoena.293
When an SEC staff contacts any individual for an investigation, she
must, and before asking any substantive questions, make certain disclosures
under the Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a. For example, she must declare that
even if the laws authorize the SEC to ask for information, a witness is not
required to cooperate and there is no direct effect upon her for refusing to
disclose information she might have disclosed. Further, SEC Rule 7 (b) allows
any person who appears in person at a formal investigation to be accompanied,
represented and advised by counsel.
The SEC Memoranda of Understanding (MOU), Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaties (MLATs) (used for Criminal Matters), ad hoc, and voluntary
cooperation are the channels available to the SEC to contact a foreign witness
residing in another country. SEC’s Office of International Affairs will review
and guide the staff members work to request information from a foreign person
without violating other countries laws.

5.2

SEC Detection Mechanism

The SEC has taken an aggressive stance against insider traders,
unrelenting against those who abuse nonpublic information and made it a clear
“No Place to Hide.”294 Insider trading typically comprises approximately 10%
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of the SEC caseload.295 The SEC’s tech-policy utilizes the fact that in a wired
globe, people are more closely connected than we imagine.296 The SEC’s techenforcement procedures are based on development of in-house, automated,
market-data-analysis systems. These systems are able to detect suspicious
trades and therefore reduce the Commission’s reliance on outside tips.297 The
SEC uses software techniques like link prediction, data synthesis, and
algorithms to trace the connection between two points on a network using
breadth-first bilateral analysis.298
The Commission adopted Rule 613 Consolidated Audit Trail (CAT)
to create a comprehensive consolidated audit trail which allows regulators to
accurately track all activity throughout the U.S. markets in National Market
System (NMS) securities.299 The CAT compiles every trade order, execution,
or cancellation process to be pulled from national stock exchanges and FINRA
databases, and by using the algorithmic detection systems on all nationalmarket trading data, the CAT system enables SEC to be everywhere at once.300
The SEC Market Abuse Unit depends on three market-analysis
programs: (1) ARTEMIS, which is built to detect suspicious trading patterns
among traders; (2) ABAP, which is designed to analyze specific transactions
in order to detect suspicious trading before market-moving causes and shows
the coordinated transactions; and (3) NEAT, which is designed to allow
enforcement investigators rapid access to transactions from a massive index.301
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Big Data and Predictive Reasonable Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 327, 354
(2015)). This study says among Facebook users, the "average number of
acquaintances separating any two people in the world was not six [as is often said
colloquially] but 4.74". Id.
297
Id. at 399.
298
Id. at 407. The author refers to an article that discusses the Graph
traversal technique. See Prateek Garg, Breadth First Search, HACKEREARTH,
https://www.hackerearth.com/practice/algorithms/graphs/breadth-firstsearch/tutorial/.
299
U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Rule 613 (Consolidated Audit Trail),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/rule613-info.htm (last updated Feb. 24,
2020).
300
Osselaer, supra note 271, at 406.
301
Mary Jo White, Chair, U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Opening Remarks at the
21st Annual International Institute for Securities Enforcement and Market Oversight
(Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/remarks-21st-internationalinstitute-for-securities-enforcement.html.
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Cross-border insider trading

The globalization of securities markets and the rapid increase in the
number of cross-border mergers and acquisitions has created the environment
where the largest insider trading violations are committed.302 A securities
violation committed while trading shares of a foreign company listed in the
U.S. abuses both the domestic and U.S. market mechanisms.303
Under some circumstances, foreign investors prefer to litigate their
securities disputes in the United States because of some practical advantages
which include: (1) the possibility of their action being brought in the form of
class action; (2) the possibility of a well-compensating jury verdict; (3)
generous discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and (4) the
possibility of obtaining legal assistance on the basis of a contingent attorney’s
fee and the absence of a loser-pays rule.304
There is no certain SEC policy on when U.S. insider trading rules will
be extraterritorially applicable, but based on SEC enforcement actions, “it is
that the trading site—the use of U.S. market mechanisms—that counts
most.”305 The SEC defines “foreign issuer” broadly to include: foreign issuer
“foreign government”, supranational entities, foreign private issuers—
essentially U.S. issuers who do not qualify as a foreign private issuer, and
certain Canadian private issuers.306 A foreign issuer might be subject to the
U.S. Securities Act of 1934 either because of the size of issued securities or
because of his free will.307
In the 1960s, the increase of international stock markets infused the
enforcement of the American federal domestic regulations.308 American lower
courts, in order to decide their jurisdiction over securities fraud cases that
include a foreign element, adopted some principles based on where the
fraudulent conduct occurred—"the conduct test"—and the nationality of the
injured investor or issuer—“the effects test.”309 This custom of adjudicating
302

Donald C. Langevoort, Cross-Border Insider Trading, 19 DICK. J. INT'L
L. 161 (2000).
303
Id. at 162.
304
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.5 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1980).
305
Langevoort, supra note 302.
306
17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4 (1967). (Providing a definition of “foreign
government,” “foreign issuer” and “foreign private issuer”).
307
Id.
308
Nagy, Painter & Sachs, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
985.
309
Staff of the U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm'n, Study of the Cross-Border Scope of
the Private Right of Action Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM'N (2012),
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2012/929y-study-cross-border-private-rights.pdf.
See Donald C. Langevoort, Schoenbaum Revisited: Limiting the Scope of Antifraud
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the jurisdiction over these kind of cases lasted until 2010 when the Supreme
Court decided Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.310
7.

Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.311

In this case, the United States Supreme Court decided “whether § 10(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of action to foreign
plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for misconduct in connection
with securities traded on foreign exchanges.”312
The Supreme Court ruled that Section 10(b) does not provide a cause
of action to a foreign plaintiff suing foreign and American defendants for
misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.313 The
Court stated,
[W]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
application, it has none. It is a longstanding principle of
American law that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary
intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States. If § 10(b) is not
extraterritorial, neither is Rule 10b–5. On its face, § 10(b)
contains nothing to suggest that it applies abroad.314

Protection in an Internationalized Securities Marketplace, 55 L. AND CONTEMP.
PROBS. 241 (1992). At that time Langevoort, argued that “the forces creating an
internationalized securities marketplace, the prevailing extraterritoriality doctrine has
become both useless and problematic.” Id. at 242.
310
Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
311
Id.
312
Id. at 250. The respondent in the case was National Australia Bank
(National), an Australian Bank whose shares were not traded on any stock exchange
in the United States. National purchased HomeSide Lending, an American mortgageservicing company headquartered in Florida. When National wrote down in its books
the value of HomeSide’s assets, National’s share prices fell. The petitioner is an
Australian shareholder of National that sued National, HomeSide, and officers of both
companies for loss the shareholder suffered because of the write-downs of
HomeSide’s assets. He claimed that the defendants violated §10(b) and 20(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b–5. He claimed that “HomeSide and its
officers had manipulated financial models to make the company’s mortgage-servicing
rights appear more valuable than they really were; and that National and its chief
executive officer were aware of this deception.” Id. at 247252.
313
Id.
314
Id. at 247. The court ruled that saying there is a domestic activity in the
United States where HomeSide executives engaged in the alleged deceptive conduct
and that shall trigger the U.S. subject matter jurisdiction is rebuttable by the fact that
“the Exchange Act’s focus is not on the place where the deception originated, but on
purchases and sales of securities in the United States. Section 10(b) applies only to
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Further, the Court rejected the notion that the Exchange Act provisions include
conduct that occurred in the United States and affected exchanges or
transactions abroad.315 The Court found that if Congress intended such foreign
application, ‘‘it would have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign
laws and procedures.’’316 Hence, in Morrison, the Court sought to limit the
extraterritorial reach of antifraud provisions in U.S. securities laws. Since then,
the Court has scaled down the exposure of foreign issuers to securities liability
risk, particularly in class-action litigation.317
One month after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison, President
Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 into law.318 The Dodd-Frank Act
amended the jurisdictional provision of § 22 of the Securities Act and § 27 of
the Exchange Act to resuscitate the old jurisdiction conduct and effect tests.319
The effect test considers “whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial
effect in the United States or upon United States citizens” while the conduct
test considers “whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States.”320
In March 2017, in SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC,321 the District of Utah ruled
that the plain language of the Dodd-Frank Act’s amendments did not expressly
overturn the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morrison.322 Further, the court found
that Congress clearly intended to authorize the SEC and DOJ to sue on the
bases of conduct or effects within the United States, regardless of where the

transactions in securities listed on domestic exchanges and domestic transactions in
other securities.” Id. at 249.
315
Id. at 273.
316
Id. at 269.
317
Yuliya Guseva, The SEC and Foreign Private Issuers: A Path to
Optimal Public Enforcement, 59 B.C.L. REV. 2055 (2018).
318
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.
319
Section 929P(b) of the Dodd-Frank Act, which amended § 22 of the
Securities Act and § 27 of the Exchange Act added the following language:
The district courts of the United States and the United States court
of any territory shall have jurisdiction of an action or proceeding
brought or instituted by the Commission or by the United States
alleging a violation of [either Section 10(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act or Section 17(a) of the Securities Act] involving: (1)
conduct within the United States that constitutes significant steps in
furtherance of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs
outside the United States and involves only foreign investors; or (2)
conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable
substantial effect within the United States.
Nagy, Painter, & Sachs, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 1000.
320
The Second Circuit, in order to justify its jurisdiction over cases with the
international element, used to apply these two tests distinct; In a recent case, the
court combined them to show the strong relevance. See Nagy, Painter, & Sachs,
supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 99599; see also SEC v. Berger, 322
F.3d 187, 192 (2d Cir. 2003).
321
SEC v. Traffic Monsoon, LLC, 245 F. Supp. 3d 1275 (D. Utah 2017).
322
Id.
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securities transactions occurred.323 However, the Dodd-Frank Act’s provisions
are very important to insider trading enforcement because they allow the SEC
and DOJ to prosecute cases no matter where the securities was listed or
purchased.324
8.

The Detection and Surveillance Role of NYSE and NASDAQ

The New York Stock Exchange, LLC (“NYSE”) and the National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation, Inc. (“NASDAQ”)
are the largest two equities-based and electronic screen-based stock exchanges
in the world.325 As self-regulatory organizations, the NYSE and NASDAQ
have their own regulatory systems with incredibly sophisticated algorithms
and computer programs that flag and alert the SEC to out-of-the-ordinary
trading.326 In turn, the SEC’s sophisticated computer programs find recent
news developments and then compile and examine lists of purchasers in order
to determine if any of them have access to inside information and are involved
in these securities transactions at all.327

323

Jonathan E. Richman, Proskauer Rose Discusses the SEC’s
Extraterritorial Reach, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (April 11, 2017),
https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/04/11/proskauer-rose-discusses-the-secsextraterritorial-reach/.
324
15 U.S.C. § 78u-6.
325
There are currently 13 registered stock exchanges operating in the
United States. Section 3(a)(1) of the Exchange Act defines the term “exchange” as:
any organization, association, or group of persons, whether
incorporated or unincorporated, which constitutes, maintains, or
provides a market place or facilities for bringing together purchasers
and sellers of securities or for otherwise performing with respect to
securities the functions commonly performed by a stock exchange
as that term is generally understood, and includes the market place
and the market facilities maintained by such exchange.
See Will Kenton, What Is the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)?, INVESTOPEDIA
(Mar. 23, 2020), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nyse.asp.
326
NYSE Regulation, https://www.nyse.com/regulation (last visited Mar.
24, 2020); Market Rules & Regulations Overview, NASDAQ,
https://www.nasdaq.com/solutions/market-rules-regulations (last visited Apr. 5,
2020).
327
More than 85% of Insider Trading violations are correlated to five
different news categories: “Product announcements, Earnings announcements,
Regulatory approval or denials, Mergers and acquisitions or Research reports, which
they collectively refer to as PERM-R events.” A study in 2017 sought to identify
mathematical patterns that capture the relationship between trading behaviors of
insiders through collecting insider trade filings by the SEC through the EDGAR
“with the aim of initiating an automated large-scale and data-driven approach to the
problem of identifying illegal insider trading.” See Adarsh Kulkarni, Priya Mani &
Carlotta Domeniconi, Network-based Anomaly Detection for Insider Trading (Feb.
19, 2017), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1702.05809.pdf.
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The NYSE

The NYSE’s regulatory system monitors securities activities and
addresses non-compliance with its rules, as well as federal securities laws, in
order to “promote just and equitable principles of trade, encourage free and
open markets, and protect investors and the public interest.”328 The NYSE’s
insider trading detection techniques apply computer algorithm-based programs
to prediction and data synthesis, similar to the SEC’s detection mechanism.329
However, there is a “middleman” on the NYSE trading floor that sits behind
the traders in every securities transaction. We will examine the authorities and
regulations that govern that person’s activities in order to curtail insider
trading.
The NYSE is an auction market, and the middleman who matches the
best price for the purchaser with the best price for the seller is called the
“Designated Market Maker” (DMM), formerly known as “the specialist.”330
The DMM plays a crucial role in the stock trading process on the NYSE.
Section 240.11(b)(1) of the Exchange Act refers to the DMM as a member
who may “act as a dealer,” or “act as broker.”331 The DMM’s responsibilities
are:332 (1) To maintain their assigned securities markets fairly and orderly; (2)
To act as dealer by matching the highest bid with the lowest offer of certain
stocks they are assigned;333 (3) To engage in with their own account, using
their own capital, and with an informed decision to reduce market volatility;
and (4) To facilitate price discovery trading to treat market imbalances or
instability in case there is no sufficient buyers or sellers.334 The DMM’s failure
“to engage in such a course of dealings will result in the suspension or
cancellation of such specialist's registration in one or more of the securities in
which such specialist is registered.”335
9.1

Regulations Govern the DMM’s Role in NYSE

The NYSE exercises its surveillance authority over the DMM at the
end of the trading day and then modifies the DMM’s prohibited Transactions
328

NYSE Regulation, supra note 326.
Id.
330
See Will Kenton, Designated Market Maker (DMM), INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/d/designated-market-maker-dmm.asp (last
updated Feb. 19, 2020).
331
See Section 3(a)(4)(A) of the Exchange Act for broker-dealer’s
definitions.
332
See Section 240.11b-1 of the Exchange Act; see also NYSE Rule 104
Governing Transactions by DMM.
333
Most specialists are responsible for trading five to ten stocks. See Fast
Answers—Specialists, https://www.sec.gov/fast-answers/answersspecialisthtm.html
(last visited Mar. 24, 2020).
334
See NYSE Rule 104(f)(ii).
335
See Section 240.11b-1-ii.
329
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in three ways.336 First, because the rule already prohibits transactions that will
create a new high or low price, the NYSE will also modify “Aggressing
Transactions” that will result in a new consolidated price.337 Second, in
determining prohibited transactions NYSE will not only consider the DMM’s
position as defining feature in its decision regarding prohibited transactions.
Third, shorten the period of announcing the DMM’s prohibited transactions to
the market.
Further, the DMM could be the first tier of measures to prevent
securities fraud. Hence, NYSE has a set of a very detailed regulations and rules
governing the conduct and actions of the DMM to ensure that the securities
are properly and fairly traded.338 Rule 2020 of the NYSE rules reads: “No
member or member organization shall effect any transaction in, or induce the
purchase or sale of, any security by means of any manipulative, deceptive or
other fraudulent device or contrivance.”339 The NYSE Regulation (“NYSER”)
of detection and surveillance oversees the trading activities on the NYSE
markets and enforces compliance with securities regulations.340
Prior to January 2016, the NYSE outsourced its surveillance and
enforcement of regulations to the Financial Industry Regulation Authority
(“FINRA”) through contract.341 After the contract period NYSER is to take the
responsibility of surveillance, investigation, and enforcement of regulations in
the NYSE markets while FINRA will continue performing surveillance on the
cross-market transactions.342 The DMM are obliged to electronically submit
all of the information regarding its trading activities to the NYSE.343 This
information will be gathered in the Intermarket Surveillance Information

336

See NYSE Rule 104(g)(i)(A)(III).
The SEC Release No. 34-84515, defined Aggressing Transaction by “the
DMM transaction that is (1) a purchase (sale) that reaches across the market to trade
as the contra-side to the Exchange published offer (bid); and (2) priced above
(below) the last differently-priced trade on the Exchange and above (below) the last
differently-priced published offer (bid) on the Exchange.”
338
See Dealings and Settlements (Rules 45—299C), FINRA (2020),
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/retired-rules-9.
339
See 2020. Use of Manipulative Fraudulent Devices, FINRA (2020),
https://www.finra.org/rules-guidance/rulebooks/finra-rules/2020.
340
NYSE Regulation, supra note 326.
341
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (Release No. 3483740; File No. SR-NYSE-2018-33) at 3, Securities and Exchange Commission
(July 30, 2018)
342
Memorandum from NYSE Regulation on NYSE Regulation January 1,
2016 Launch of Certain Surveillance, Investigations, and Enf’t Functions Currently
Performed By FINRA to All NYSE, NYSE MKT, and NYSE ARCA Members and
Member Orgs. (Nov. 23, 2015).
343
Dealings and Settlements (Rules 45—299C) supra note 338.
337
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System (ISIS) of the NYSE.344 The ISIS information will be used to observe
price movements and detect market unusual trading patterns. Computer
formula techniques will examine insider trading through analyzing ISIS data
and detect market activities that has the characteristics of a trading activity that
violates the rules.
10.

The National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
(“NASDAQ”)345

NASDAQ is a market developed by the National Association of
Securities
Dealers
(NASD)
to
be
a stock
market
that
services electronic securities trading internationally.346 “The Nasdaq Stock
Market has three distinctive tiers: The Nasdaq Global Select Market, The
Nasdaq Global Market and The Nasdaq Capital Market. Applicants must
satisfy certain financial, liquidity and corporate governance requirements to be
approved for listing on any of these market tiers.”347
The market structure of NASDAQ is different from that of the NYSE.
The model of NASDAQ, as an electronic screen-based system, was initially
created to serve as an option to the specialist-based system.348 NASDAQ is a
dealer’s market where the sellers and the purchasers will not be participating
in a direct trade but will be trading through a dealer. In the NYSE, the DMM
are the market makers, while in NASDAQ the market makers are the dealers
who will be on at least one side of every trade.349
10.1

Regulations Govern the Dealer’s Role in NASDAQ

The dealers that are the members of NASDAQ are subject, in strict
compliance, to the rules and regulations of the SEC, FINRA, and NASDAQ
itself.350 Those rules include the minimum capital, sales methods, trade

344

James L. Cochrane, Brian McNamara, James E. Shapiro, & Michael J.
Simon, The Structure and Regulation of the New York Stock Exchange, 19 J. CORP.
L. (1993).
345
NASDAQ Inc is an American international financial
services corporation that owns and operates the NASDAQ stock market and eight
European stock exchanges. See Nasdaq Inc., WIKIPEDIA,
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nasdaq, Inc. (last modified Mar. 28, 2020).
346
Id.
347
See Nasdaq Listing Center, Initial Listing Guide, (2018).
348.
Will Kenton, NASDAQ Global Select Market Composite, INVESTOPEDIA,
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/nasdaq.asp (last updated Mar. 2, 2020).
349
James L. Cochrane, Brian McNamara, James E. Shapiro, & Michael J.
Simon, supra note 344.
350
See NASDAQ, INC., FORM 10-K, EDGARPRO (Feb. 28, 2018),
http://ir.nasdaq.com/static-files/a6d84f2a-c05a-484d-9d3b-06573888344f.

110

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW VOL. XIII:II

practices, record of information, and protection of funds of the customers.351
The rules and regulations imposed on NASDAQ’s dealers also serve as a firstlevel measure against securities fraud.352
For the purpose of detection and surveillance, NASDAQ employed
supplementary measures in addition to the rules and regulations imposed on
its dealers. The Securities Exchange Act obliges issuers that trade their
securities on NASDAQ to file an annual report and to provide NASDAQ with
any information requested in case of any suspicious market activities.353 The
filing process is done electronically through Electronic Data Gathering,
Analysis, Retrieval “EDGAR.”354 As we said in NYSE, NASDAQ also applied
advanced technology techniques to detect insider trading violations. NASDAQ
has adopted Artificial Intelligence to surveil insider trading and securities
fraud.355 The software indicates the transaction that has unusual linkage of
interests.356 The information of any suspicious trading activity will be passed
to the SEC for investigation.357
Furthermore, NASDAQ recently introduced the SMARTS Trade
Surveillance and SMARTS Market Surveillance systems for detecting various
kinds of securities fraud or dark trading activities, including but not limited to
price control and insider trading.358 The SMARTS Market Surveillance system
is described as “the industry benchmark for the real-time” and T1 solutions for
market surveillance, supervision, and compliance.359 The SMARTS Trade
Surveillance system focuses specifically on the surveillance and monitor of
trading activities rather than the market as a whole. It alerts the compliance
teams of the seller in case of an appearance of any suspicious trading activities
resulting from the detection, investigation, or system analysis.360

351

Id.
Id.
353
Guide to Broker-Dealer Registration, SEC (Apr. 2008),
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investorpublications/divisionsmarketregbdguidehtm.html#foot1.
354
Id.
355
Supra note 326.
356
Sara R. Hedberg, IJCAI-03 Conference Highlights, AI MAGAZINE, Dec.
15, 2003, at 9.
357
Id.
358
Roy Girasa, Jessica A. Magaldi, & Joseph DiBenedetto, Shedding Light
on Dark Pools: Recent Regulatory Attempts Toward Transparency and Oversight of
Alternative Trading Systems, 37 N.E. J. LEGAL STUD. 75 (2018).
359
Nasdaq (SMARTS) Trade Surveillance, NASDAQ,
https://business.nasdaq.com/market-tech/marketplaces/market-surveillance (last
visited Mar. 31, 2020).
360
Id.
352
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C. Prosecution of Insider Trading in the Egyptian Legal System
The Public Prosecutor's Office is the main Egyptian authority
empowered to initiate all kinds of criminal charges. To reach the end of justice,
the law, in some circumstances, limits the Public Prosecutor's Office
prosecuting authority and makes it contingent on another entity’s request.
Egyptian’s Capital Market Law (CML) makes the Public Prosecutor's Office
authority to charge for securities violations contingent on a written permission
from the chairman of the Financial Regularity Authority.
1.

Financial Regularity Authority and the Public Prosecutor's Office
Prosecutions:

In order to unify the supervisory authority over the entire Egyptian
non-banking financial markets, Article 3 of Law no.10 of 2009 replaced the
Capital Market Authority by the Financial Regularity Authority (FRA).361 The
legislator wanted FRA to be the public authority in charge to enforce the
provisions of CML 95 of 1992 over the entire Egyptian Stock Market. The
FRA is an independent surveillance authority over the Egyptian stock market.
Article 93 of the Executive Regulations of CML states that “the Authority
(FSA) shall oversee the trading market and shall ensure compliance with the
law and the executive regulations with respect to prohibited activities, such as
fictitious transactions, price rigging, deceptive devices, cheating, manipulation
and fraudulent activities in connection with securities transactions.” Hence,
the FRA is the main governmental authority in charge of achieving the stability
and integrity of all of the non-banking financial markets. Additionally, the
FRA in the Egyptian legal system is responsible for spreading investment
culture and also licenses non-banking financial activities.
This means that the FRA not only exercises its surveillance authority
over listed companies. Its authority extends, according to Egyptian companies’
law no. 159 of 1981 to Joint Stock Companies, Limited Partnerships by
Shares, and Limited Liability Partnerships.

361

We may also refer to FRA by Egyptian Financial Supervision Authority
(EFSA). See FIN. REG. AUTHORITY,
http://www.fra.gov.eg/content/efsa_en/efsa_pages_en/efsa_clarification_en.htm (last
visited Mar. 31, 2020).
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1.1

FRA Enforcement Resources

The Egyptian FRA executes its obligations through the following sectors and
offices:362
1.
Sector of Financial Securities, Financial Statements and
Corporate Finance;
2.

Sector of Surveillance and Corporate Governance;

3.

Sector of New Business Registration and Licensing;

4.

Sector of Information Services;

5.

Sector of Financial, Administrative Affairs and Personnel;

6.

Central Department for Chairman’s Office Affairs;

7.

Central Department for Legal Affairs;

8.

Central Department for Enforcement;

9.

Central Department for Researches and Policies;

10.
Central Department for Capital Market Development and its
Securities;
11.

Central Department for Investors Complaints;

12.

Central Department for customer Services;

13.

Central Department for Governmental Insurance Fund.

362
Senior Management, Fɪɴ. Rᴇɢ. Aᴜᴛʜᴏʀɪᴛʏ,
http://www.fra.gov.eg/content/efsa_en/efsa_pages_en/dir1_en.htm (last visited Dec.
7, 2018).
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The Egyptian FRA issued its own code of ethics for its personnel to prohibit
any action that might undermine public trust and the integrity of the Authority.
These rules are:363
(1) Fundamental ethics: The staff shall observe the integrity and good
conduct needed to gain public trust, fairness, and non-discrimination in their
interaction with the public, execute job tasks with due diligence, cooperate
with other FRA staff, be transparent without violating protected information,
and observe a high level of decorum with any person interacting with the
Authority.364
(2) Exchange of data and private information: Staff shall maintain capital
market information privacy and not share it outside the Authority; staff shall
take all necessary precautions to keep all private information secret; it is
prohibited for the FRA staff, except those who are authorized, to make a press
release (especially information related to stock prices and corporations listed
on the stock market as well as any corporate information discovered as a result
of FRA surveillance procedures); it is prohibited for FRA staff members or
their relatives to receive any benefits in exploiting nonpublic information that
is possessed as a result of being in an FRA personnel role.365
(3) Trade on Stock Market: FRA staff are not allowed to trade personally, or
through any other person, on listed corporation stocks except in IPOs, public
mutual funds, governmental pounds, or unlisted securities. If any member of
the FRA owns or inherited stocks in Egyptian Exchange (EXG) when this
decree comes into force, that member shall not sell it before putting the FRA
on notice.366
(4) Gifts and Courtesy Policy: FRA staff are prohibited from accepting any
gifts from any entity subject to FRA surveillance authority except when the
gift is nominal; gifts do not have to be pecuniary but could be a discount for a
service received or a free vacation for the staff member or the staff member’s
relatives.367
1.2

FRA Detection Mechanism

There are three main systems of detection adopted by the FRA:

363

See the decree of the FRA Chairman no. 75 on June 7, 2010; see also
EFSA Staff Code of Ethics, Egyptian Financial Supervisory Authority (EFSA) (Apr.
2010),
http://www.fra.gov.eg/content/efsa_en/pool_extra_efsa_en/methaq1_efsa_en.htm.
364
Id. at 7.
365
Id. at 8.
366
Id. at 9.
367
Id. at 11.
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(1) Observation of stock market bids: The FRA Central Department of
Enforcement has a unit connected with the Egyptian Stock Exchange
trading screens. The units observe the transactions and take notes for
bids and deals closed by broker-dealer’s firms and then track its future
impact on stock prices. If there was any suspicious activity committed,
the unit will open an investigation to address any possible enforcement
action.
(2) Corporation’s file examination: This particular manner of
surveillance is executed by examining a corporation’s file and its
periodical financial and administrative reports presented to the FRA.
(3) Corporation field visit: The CML grants the FRA staff the powers
and authority of law enforcement officers. FRA staff may or may not
notify corporations about FRA’s pending field visits where they may
examine the corporation’s books and ask for the production of any
specific documents or question any of the corporation’s personnel in
order to ensure the correct observation of the regulations.
1.3

FRA Prosecuting Authority

The Egyptian FRA resembles the American SEC in its role of oversight
and ensuring compliance with the law of the stock market. The CML in article
69 (bis) states: “It shall not be allowed to prosecute for crimes of CML except
by virtue of a written request from the chairman of the Financial Regularity
Authority.”368 Thus, the law gives the FRA’s chairman—solely—the authority
to initiate criminal charges of insider trading or any securities fraud committed
in violation of the CML and its executive regulations. Criminal charges under
the CML are brought about by a report signed by the chairman of the FRA that
includes an explanation of violations and asks the Public Prosecutor's Office
to initiate such charges. This report is an administrative report, not a judicial
order, which means it does not initiate the criminal prosecution and is not
subject to judicial review.369 The report gives the Public Prosecutor's Office
the authority to initiate criminal charges. The FRA report does not oblige the
Office to prosecute, as the Office has the discretion to investigate and
ultimately proceed with the charges.
On the other hand, if the Public Prosecutor's Office knows about the
CML violation from any source and desires to initiate criminal charges against
the violators, the Public Prosecutor's Office is required to obtain the FRA
chairman’s permission to proceed with the investigations. The CML also
provides the chairman of the FRA with the authority to cancel or to dismiss
368

Article 69 (bis) added by law no. 123 for 2008; see also article 6 of law
no. 10 for 2009, bar Public Prosecutor's Office from initiating a criminal
investigation without a written consent from FRA.
369
Nisreen F. Ibrahim, Alreqaba Aledareyaha Wal qdaieyaha Ala A’mal
Aledaraha fe Magal Souq AlAwraq Al malyiah [The administrative and judicial
surveillance over the public administrative authority role on stock market] (2016).
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charges despite the state of progress in investigations or court judgment
execution.370
Article 49 of the CML grants the FRA officers the power and authority
of law enforcement officers. This authorizes FRA officers to access registers,
books, documents and any information in the company's offices, in the stock
exchange, or other offices where these documents may exist. It also obliges
such entities to cooperate and to produce a copy of any documents that may be
requested by officers. This article reflects the intent of the Egyptian legislature
to curtail securities market violations and to reach a reasonable level of
efficiency. It suggests that the FRA obligations are not merely to issue licenses
and permit securities offerings, but to take positive steps to reduce market
violations.
1.4

FRA Administrative Sanctions:

Besides its prosecuting authority, the FRA has the power to apply
administrative sanctions for corporate violations. According to article 31 of
the CML, these sanctions could include a notice asking the company to cancel
or stop the violations within a specific timeframe, limitation of the company’s
scope of business,371 or appointment of an independent member on the
company’s board of directors. The appointed member will oversee and
participate in the board decisions. Also, FRA sanctions could amount to
dissolution of the board and appointment of an authorized agent until a new
board of directors is appointed. Similarly, such sanctions could compel the
company to increase its security deposit in order to protect investors.
2.

Egyptian Stock Exchange

The Egyptian market used to have two stock exchanges: the
Alexandria Stock Exchange and the Cairo Stock Exchange. Law no. 123 for
2008 merged them together into one stock exchange called the Egyptian Stock
Exchange (EXG). Under Rule 902(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, the
Egyptian Exchange (EGX) is an offshore securities market.372 The EXG is a
governmental public entity, but the CML allows the establishment of private
370

The policy objectives behind authorizing the FRA chairman to enter into
settlement or reconciliation agreement with the convicted of securities fraud is to
trump the economic benefits over the incarceration punishment when the convicted
accept to pay the double of the statutory fine. We do not agree with this policy
because deterrence could not be achieved, especially when the defendant is a
corporation or a wealthy businessman.
371
See FRA Chairman decree no. 885 for 2018 (freezing trading activities
of Grand Investment company for a month); see also FRA Cdecree no. 888 for 2018
(freezing the activities of TIBA for Securities Brokerage for a month).
372
Letter from Paul M. Dudek, Chief, Office of Int’l Corp. Fin., to Sameh
El Torgoman, Chairman, Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchs. (Apr. 6, 2003) (on file
in the SEC online archives).
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corporations to exercise stock exchange business.373 The EXG executes its
responsibilities through a board of nine members headed by the EXG
chairman, and it includes a member from the Egyptian Central Bank. Three
members represent capital market companies, and two members representing
listed companies.374 EXG decrees are administrative orders amenable to
judicial review.375 The EXG board of directors regulates the stock market
trading rules and oversees its efficiency. The EGX is the primary and
secondary equity market and exchange for both stocks and bonds.376 The EGX
consists of the official market, which includes publicly listed companies, and
the unofficial market, where the transfer of unlisted securities takes place. The
unofficial market transactions are still subject to revision and approval of the
EGX.377
Article 21 of CML states: The chairman of EXG may suspend trading
bids aiming at price manipulation, and he may revoke transactions which
violate securities market regulations. He may also suspend the trading of a
given security in case it causes harm to the market or may revoke transactions
that are executed in violation of the CML securities provision.
3.

Private Right of Action Under Egyptian Law

Egyptian law allows bringing a case for civil remedies incurred as a
result of violations of the securities law. The executive regulation of the CML
in article 218 expressly allows shareholders to bring private actions when they
suffer financial loss because of insider trading. The law does not require the
proof of actual reliance on a defendant’s misstatement or the existence of a
fiduciary relationship; it only requires the showing of causation that one
actually suffered losses because of the insider transaction or being a victim of
securities market manipulation.
4.

Insider Trading Jurisdiction

Since insider trading under Egyptian law is a crime, the jurisdiction to
adjudicate the violation of insider trading is a non-administrative court
(Economic Courts).378 The reason behind establishing Economic Courts as
373

Law No. 95 of 1992 (Law of Capital Market), supra note Error!
Bookmark not defined..
374
See article 6 of the presidential decree no. 191 for 2009.
375
Ibrahim, supra note 369.
376
Omar S. Bassiouny & Ahmed Abdelgawad, Equity Capital Markets in
Egypt: Regulatory Overview (2016).
377
Id.
378
For more details about the Egyptian judicial system, see Mohamed
Abdel Wahab, Update: An Overview of the Egyptian Legal System and Legal
Research, GLOBALLEX (2008), https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Egypt1.html
(“[T]he Egyptian Judiciary is comprised of secular and religious courts,
administrative and non-administrative courts, a Supreme Constitutional Court, penal
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specialized courts in the Egyptian judiciary system is to fulfill the requirements
of the corporate sector by expending the dispute resolution period and to
guarantee that commercial and economic cases are heard by a well-informed
panel.
The law of the Egyptian Economic Courts (EEC) no. 120 for 2008 in article 4
granted the courts of first instance and courts of appeals of the EEC—solely—
the jurisdiction to hear criminal cases of the CML. Further, the EEC in article
6 granted the courts of first instance of EEC jurisdiction to litigate CML
monetary disputes on cases over five Egyptian million.379
CONCLUSION
Insider Trading in the Egyptian Law Needs a Drafting Reform:
As per the insider trading provisions of CML and its executive
regulation, the Egyptian legislature has a clear intent to prohibit insider
trading. The Egyptian legislature expressly criminalized insider trading in the
CML and its executive regulation as well as in article 345 of the Egyptian
Criminal Code, which regulates securities anti-fraud provisions that are
applicable to insider trading offenses. However, the law of insider trading is
sometimes misplaced, or its drafting style fails to properly address the offense
of insider trading. This can be clarified as follows:
(1) The language of Article 64 of the CML does not clearly encompass all
insider trading presumed violations. Insider trading laws need to be drafted
using generic terms applicable not only to officials of FRA or any market
player whose actions are governed by securities law, but also to any person
who trades stocks on the basis of material nonpublic information. Furthermore,
even though Article No. 20 (bis) of the CML prohibits tipping of inside
information by using the term “any person,” its drafting style improperly
inserted the definition of information materiality in addition to including
causation terms into the text, which might bar charging for insider trading if
there are no direct and immediate losses incurred as a result of insider trading.
(2) The executive regulation of the CML in Article 319 not only interprets
the legislation of the CML, but it also exceeds the scope of interpretation to
criminalize insider trading. Since the law of insider trading in the CML is not
self-sufficient as a basis to prosecute for the offense of insider trading, the
executive regulation of the CML provisions will be required in order to prove

courts, civil and commercial courts, personal status and family courts, national
security courts, labour courts, military courts, as well as other specialized courts or
circuits.”).
379
However, if the defendant in a CML basis dispute is a public
administrative authority or the plaintiff pray to revoke or amend a public authority
decree the jurisdiction will be concluded to the State Council Administrative Courts.
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a well-grounded insider trading case. However, this is not constitutional
because the executive regulation is issued as per a ministerial decree.
(3) The executive regulation of the CML regulated an uncomprehensive
separate prohibition of insider trading that is only applicable to portfolio
management and brokerage companies. Article 244 of section five of chapter
six of the executive regulation prohibits owners, directors, and employees of a
portfolio management company or brokerage company from transacting on
any securities on the basis of nonpublic information. The phrasing of Article
244 is redundant because, if the CML law of insider trading is a general and
abstract law, there is no need to reregulate insider trading for portfolio
management and brokerage companies. Yet, Article 244 insider trading law
does not encompass all conceivable insider trading violations of owners,
directors, and employees of a portfolio management company or brokerage
companies.
The Need for an Effective Enforcement Mechanism and Adequate
Resources
Langevoort once said, “One of the most obviously, and troubling,
phenomena in international securities regulation is that even as the ‘law on the
books’ in most developed countries . . . the commitment of surveillance and
enforcement resources varies considerably.”380 Egyptian law ostensibly aims
at prohibiting securities fraud. The Egyptian judiciary system does not tolerate
securities fraud and firmly applies securities law. However, there is no
effective enforcement mechanism in place. On the other hand, although the
United States insider trading law in some circumstances does not achieve
clarity and completeness, the SEC applies a very effective enforcement
mechanism.
The Need for More Resources
In order for the Egyptian FRA and the Egyptian Stock Exchange to
undertake their surveillance role over the securities market, they need to adopt
the same theory of detection and enforcement mechanisms employed in highly
active stock markets. As we explained in Chapter II, the fraud detection
mechanism adopted by the SEC relies on smart technology and computer
programs.

380
Donald C. Langevoort, Cross-Border Insider Trading, 19 Dɪᴄᴋ. J. Iɴᴛ'ʟ
L. 161, 163 (2000).
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The FRA responsibilities over the entire non-banking sector are
crucial. In order to undertake these responsibilities, it requires adequate
resources to better guide the Egyptian economic reform.381

381

In addition to the insider trading law reform and while the Egyptian
authorities relentlessly strive to boost the Egyptian economy, the stock market’s
refinement should be their top priority. As such, the main role expected from the
Egyptian FRA and EGX at the moment is to ease the capital formation to push the
wheels of such heavy industry. The Egyptian legislature has been pleading with
corporations working in Egypt to list their securities in the EGX and has attempted to
incentivize corporations to do so through a considerable tax deduction scheme. Yet,
there is a meager number of listed corporations in the EGX. Time is running out; it is
naïve to wait for family-based corporations to build the Egyptian economy. For
Egyptian national policy to influence real investment, the legislature should
concentrate on assisting the private sector and startup businesses in particular.
Capital formation in Egypt’s economic system is still very costly because of the
exorbitant interest rate in the entire economic system, and this could undermine the
practicability of capital formation. The Egyptian economic system is in a dire need
of the investment of middle-class citizenry in corporations’ stocks. Consequently,
they had to introduce and renew public trust in the stock market. This could be the
only solution to both overcome the challenge of high interest rates and ease the
capital formation of new businesses. Tax deduction incentives should be given
primarily to corporations that devote a percentage of their revenues to research
funding. The Egyptian legislature should enact a law that considers such research
funding to be a social responsibility of corporations operating in Egypt. We believe
that only one important Egyptian patent can push the economic growth forward to
make great strides.
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